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LIMITED CARTELISM INVITED!
I. General
Virtually unnoticed by the popular press, President Clinton signed
the National Cooperative Production Amendments of 1993 (NCPA)' on
June 10, 1993. In a purely formal sense, the Amendments merely
modified the National Cooperative Research Act of 1984 (NCRA).2 In
substance, NCPA did far more.
Senator Leahy, as an incident to introducing one of the two 1993
companion bills that matured into NCPA, said its point was to "address
the need for joint production ventures" and thereby to permit U.S.
industry to meet "most serious competitive challenges." 3 Congress'
ultimate enactment explicitly lamented that "the antitrust laws may have
been mistakenly perceived as inhibiting cooperative innovation
arrangements that promote competition" for which reason a "clarification
of the law would serve a useful purpose. "' Thereafter, NCPA's purpose
is described as being "to promote innovation, facilitate trade, and
strengthen the competitiveness of the ... [United States] . . . in world
markets"5 by clarifying the applicability of the "rule of reason standard"
first communicated in the National Cooperative Research Act. of 1982
(NCRA).6
Pertinent committee reports contain assurances against NCPA
working "unnecessary substantive changes" to antitrust laws.'
Obviously unable to cope with the policy decision implicit in use of the
word "unnecessary," the writer is constrained to observe significant
substantive changes. Despite fudge about clarification and avoiding
"unnecessary" changes, there are significant effects on federal
substantive antitrust rules of decision as well as, more remarkably, state
1. National Cooperative Production Amendments of 1993 (NCPA), Pub. L. No. 103-42, 107
Stat. 117 (1993) (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4305 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
2. National Cooperative Research Act of 1984 (NCRA), Pub. L. No. 98-462, 98 Stat. 1815
(1984) (codified at §§ 4301-4305 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). On yet another formal level, NCRA as
amended by NCPA was dubbed National Cooperative Research & Production Act of 1993
(NCRPA). NCPA § 3(a).
3. S. REP. No. 51, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 64 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) 725, 726 (June 10, 1993) (emphasis added). H.R. 1313, a companion bill, was introduced
simultaneously. H.R. REP. No. 94, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 176.
4. NCPA § 2(a)(2) (emphasis added).
5. Id. § 2(b) (emphasis added).
6. NCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 4302. See generally John A. Maher & Nancy J. LaMont, National
Cooperative Research Act of 1984: Cartelism for High-Tech Ventures (and Others?), 7 DICK. J.
INT'L L. 1 (1988).
7. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 94,1, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 176 (emphasis added).
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antitrust laws' and § 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act
(FTCA). 9 Use of the word "unparalleled" to describe such effects is
almost warranted by the fact that the substantially similar NCRA and,
before it, the formally different Export Trading Company Act of 1982
(ETCA) were limited in industrial scope when compared to NCPA. That
the states had no voice in modification of their laws' applications is a
given. It is also a given that Congress' preemption of the states is
beyond Constitutional reproach whether or not one considers NCPA ill-
advised.
In these connections, let it be said that President Clinton - oft
charged with instinctive tendencies toward what can be charitably styled.
as less than full disclosure - spoke far more openly concerning NCPA
than did Congress. In March 1993, when announcing support for S. 574
(Leahy, Thurmond & Biden) and H.R. 1313 (Brooks, Fish et. al.), the
President observed that "[i]t is altogether appropriate to lift the legal
barriers that prevent good companies from playing to win in the global
market - provided, of course, our antitrust laws continue to prevent
improper collusion. Now is the time . . . to strip away outdated
impediments to our growth and potential." 0
Tycoons of the Beef and Oil Trust eras would have appreciated what
is wrought by NCRPA. Predictably, when the word goes forth,
investment bankers and would-be tycoons of a new age will be quick to
take advantage. NCPA so modified NCRA, and thereby ordinary
applications of federal and state antitrust laws plus FTCA, as to
commend that almost every new capital-intensive endeavor, every new
capital-intensive facility, intended to service selling into foreign and
domestic markets be cast as a joint venture! Indeed, the tack might
appeal to industries that, albeit not capital-intensive in terms of plant, are
ill-disposed to competition. In the capital-intensive context, enterprises
uncomfortable with substantive partners can limit partners to relative
silence as investors in minute percentages of joint production ventures
but nonetheless achieve full antitrust-minimizing benefits of NCRPA. It
is even possible to argue that commonly-controlled affiliates can joint
venture to elude various antitrust norms.
8. NCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 4302, amended by NCPA § 3(d).
9. Id. § 4301(a)(2).
10. White House Press Release (3/11/93) extracted from S. REP. No. 51, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess., reprinted in 64 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 725, 730 (June 10, 1993) (emphasis
added). Quite a different case was made in Prof. D.K. Stockdale's Antitrust and International
Competitiveness; Is Encouraging Production Joint Ventures Worth the Cost?, 7 HIGH TECH L.J. 269
(1992) but NCPA's legislative advocates obviously preferred yielding to petitions based on
acknowledgedly incorrect perceptions.
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Enacting NCPA, Congress again assumed the role of industrial
macro-psychologist as it purported to ameliorate fears of those claiming
to be plagued by a spectre of antitrust prosecutions."I The therapist did
not indulge much care for rationality or irrationality of the patients'
fears. The solons' principal albeit not exclusive therapy entailed
redrawing NCRA's very charitable "rule of reason standard" not only to
embrace production of goods and services by joint ventures but also to
induce a look to "worldwide capacity" as relevant markets are defined
in litigation affected by NCRPA.' 2 This "rule of reason standard" is
not limited to those fearful of prosecutions under the Sherman Antitrust
Act 3 (of which only §§ 1 and 3 are peculiarly associated with a "rule
of reason"' 4 as well as per se rules 5 theoretically contrary if not
contradictory to rule of reason analyses). Rather, assuming venturers'
qualification as a joint production venture "defined" in NCRPA, 6 the
rechristened Act's "rule of reason standard" is imposed on the many
substantive antitrust rules of decision to which Brandeis' elegant rule of
reason formulation" is entirely foreign.
11. The Export Trading Company Act of 1982 (ETCA), tits. IIn, IV, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96
Stat. 1233 (1982) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) cheerfully responded to untested
.perceptions" that U.S. antitrust prejudiced export initiatives. H.R. Rep. No. 637(11), 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2489. See generally D. UNKOVIC, ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES AND THE EXPORT TRADING COMPANY Acr OF 1982 (BNA, 1984)
A-16 & A-17. Passing NCRA, Congress spoke to eliminating "any misconception" that U.S.
antitrust laws impeded formation of joint research and development efforts. H.R. REP. NO. 1044,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3133. Congress' recent concern that
entrepreneurial complaints presumably addressed by NCPA "may" be rooted in misperceptions has
been remarked. See supra text accompanying note 4. Ironically, Assistant Attorney General for
Antitrust Anne K. Bingaman spoke on August 10, 1993 against the
view that the increased complexity and internationalization of our economy makes
antitrust policy less important .... [The converse is true .... [Tlhat some ... firms
which . . . compete with U.S. firms originate in nations with economic systems that
differ from ours is not cause to relax ... enforcement of our antitrust .... I disfavor
creation of new antitrust exemptions.
U.S. Dep't of Justice Press Release re remarks to American Bar Association.
12. NCPA § 3(d) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 4302). That the Justice Department got the message
is suggested by Assistant Attorney General Bingaman's subsequent observation that ". . . parochial
notions of antitrust enforcement have been rendered meaningless by the expanding global economy."
Address on Oct. 27, 1994 before the Fordham Corporate Law Institute as released to press by U.S.
Dep't of Justice.
13. Antitrust Amendments (Sherman) Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-8 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
14. See generally Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
15. See generally United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940).
16. NCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(6), amended by NCPA § 3(b).
17. See Chicago Board of Trade, 246 U.S. 231.
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Per NCRPA definitions, "antitrust laws" include FTCA § 5(a)(1)
but only to the degree it addresses "unfair methods of competition. " "
The same curiosity was observable in NCRA, 19 and a variation is
observable in ETCA, 2 by reason of which Congress can be described
as consistently, albeit presumably unconsciously, setting a trap for the
unwary." Congress' most recent indirect attack on state antitrust laws
is extrinsic to the NCRPA definitional structure. As in NCRA, state
antitrust is subordinated to the NCRPA "rule of reason standard" by the
very language enunciating the standard.'
The implied overall thesis is that per se rules are a feature of every
one of the NCRPA defined "antitrust laws" plus all state antitrust
schemes. Such a thesis is invalid. Antitrust per se rules are generated
in and have pertinence only to prosecutions under §§ 1 and 3 of the
Sherman Act and some states' analogues to the Act. Whether or not
successive classes of solons knew what they were doing as they enacted
NCRA and thereafter NCPA, the 103d Congress has ordained dramatic
changes - always assuming the involvement of venturers in
combinations in the form of trusts or otherwise qualifying as joint
ventures defined in NCRPA - in applications of various federal and
state substantive antitrust rules of decision not usually thought to involve
Taft and Brandeis' "rule of reason."
It is not the point of this Article to condemn what Congress has
done. 2  The author's ambition is merely to describe - on a non-
exhaustive basis - many of the departures from prior law worked by the
1993-94 Congress, even as pertinent legislators disclaimed such a
18. NCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(1).
19. Id. § 4301.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 4021(6).
21. As enacted in 1914, Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA), § 5, 38 Stat. 719 (1914),
struck at only "unfair methods of competition" to ludicrous effect in FTC v. Raladam, 283 U.S.
643, 647-49 (1931). The Wheeler-Lea Amendments of 1938, 52 Stat. III (1938), engrafted "unfair
or deceptive acts or practices" with telling effect not at all limited to consumer protection. See FTC
v. Brown Shoe, 384 U.S. 316, 321-22 (1966); FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson, 405 U.S. 233, 244
(1972). A curious effect of NCRPA is to subject FTC consumer protection, to the extent it relies
on precedent accumulated under the "unfair methods of competition" rubric that stood alone from
1914 to 1938, to the NCRPA "rule of reason standard." Ralph Nader, Esq. & Company need not
erect barricades - yet - since the Wheeler-Lea amendments, unaffected by NCRPA and ETCA,
will support most consumer protection measures.
22. NCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 4302, amended by NCPA § 3(d). The standard's text is set forth as
text accompanying note 83 infra.
23. The author acknowledges that, in the modem Congress, much is committed to presumably
expert and most certainly enormous staffs but legislators' delegation of labor in the vineyards cannot
shield them from collective responsibility for statutory consequences and one can make an ethical
case for visiting greater responsibility on legislators who attach their names to bills or chair pertinent
committees.
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purpose, and thereby to accommodate the bar by suggesting opportunities
for venturesome clients as they contemplate commercial values implicit
in indulging species of conduct of which some were thought anti-social
limitations on free markets for approximately a century.
To achieve deployment of the NCRPA "rule of reason standard"
against prosecutions proceeding by reference to conduct either ordinarily
offensive per se to the Sherman Act or offensive to antitrust rules to
which the classic rule of reason is foreign, little is demanded of NCRPA
joint venturers save, to the degree pre-existing facilities are used for
production, channeling such production to goods or services that
constitute "a new product or technology. "I Thus, if a joint venturer's
capital contribution is an existing plant for use in service of the venture,
care must be exerted to insure that the plant is shifted to a "new product
or technology." Alas, "new product or technology" is not a defined
term of art. Since there rarely is anything new under the sun, the term
presumably contemplates either a technology new to each venturer or a
product or service new to the venturers' respective lines. In the context
of modem realities, the term should be construed to embrace significant
improvements on the venturers' preexisting lines of endeavor. This
inevitably will lead to nice fact questions. Would a 1994 Mustang Coupe
be found to be a "new product" contrasted with a 1964 Mustang Coupe?
Each is essentially an automobile. Distinguishing characteristics are of
sorts that drive automobile manufacturers' annualized Pavlovian
marketing, and automotive technology has changed remarkably in twenty
years. If the two should be found to be different products with the 1994
version deemed "new," would the same result have flowed from
comparing the 1964 and the 1965 vintage Mustangs? They differ, but
thirty years ago would differences such as tail-lights have been regarded
as merely fanciful? What if enlightened production planning had
changed the production line? Does a dramatically improved production
floor lay-out constitute a "new ... technology?" Surely Congress' 1993
largess is not explicitly limited to lines of endeavor entirely new to
humankind? If "new product or technology" is limited to hitherto
unknown product and service lines or to previously untested production
technologies, Congress played a malicious game and those caring souls
surely wouldn't do that.
24. NCRA, 15 U.S.C. §4301(b)(7), amended byNCPA § 3(c)(7) (emphasis added). Although
main text focuses on implications for would-be production joint venturers who would contribute
existing facilities to the venture, note that effect of § 4301(b)(7) is not limited to pre-existing
facilities that were controlled by a venturer!
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Taking another but not unrelated tack, sophisticated investment
bankers and other enterprise consultants should not be slow to appreciate
that pan-industrial amalgamations "in [the] form of trust or
otherwise,"I always paying careful attention to NCRPA's joint venture
definition, are evoked for entrepreneurs uncomfortable with per se and
other rules who have wit and capacity either (a) to assign significantly
"new" tasks, or utilization of "new" technologies, to plants contributed
to or acquired for joint ventures planned as such; (b) to cause each client
heretofore given to individually planning new production facilities to
consider generating a "joint venture" per plant per upgraded service or
product; or (c) even to consider creeping mergers via evolving plant-by-
plant joint ventures (to the degree that ultimate capital structures such as
the multinationally incorporated Royal Dutch or Unilever would be a
comfortable fit). Contemplating these and other potencies, it must be
remembered that nothing in NCRPA either demands embodiment of a
qualifying joint venture in a legal entity distinct from the venturers
themselves or disqualifies a "joint venture" from NCRPA's favorable
treatment by reference to percentages of ownership. Thus, a commonly
owned entity or other relationship with a 99:1 or 99.99:0.01 control
relationship seems technically adequate to achieve the NCRPA "rule of
reason standard" but the cautious - worried about limitation of products
liability and courts' proper recent tendencies, in antitrust analyses, to
honor substance over form - may wish to opt for a separately
incorporated vehicle and to design an 80:20, 85:15 or some other control
ratio comfortable in the contexts of tax laws and state corporate laws'
"short-form" merger provisions. The speed with which entrepreneurial
appreciations of Congress' invitations to eliminate "horizontal"
competition, and also to proceed with vertical integrations, will proceed
to implementation should come to be limited on industry-by-industry
bases only by references to capital costs naturally restricting ease-of-entry
and relative tractabilities of existing plant sites to "new" product and
service lines.
Despite cant suggesting desire to improve the domestic industrial
base in order to enhance international competition, it must be stressed
25. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
26. See, e.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Independent Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984) (wholly-
owned subsidiary regarded as an economic entity with its parent for purposes of defeating the focus
of the Sherman Antitrust Act's § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1, on conduct indulged by two or more persons).
For those who would dare to cause an NCRPA joint venture of a parent and a wholly-owned
subsidiary, a joint venture of two or more wholly-owned subsidiaries, or some combination of these,
Copperweld is a warning. But it is not a clear warning to those who would cause controlled but not
wholly-owned affiliates to be NCRPA joint venturers.
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that the utility of the NCRPA "rule of reason standard" is not tied either
to joint venturers' combinations being headquartered in or otherwise tied
to the United States. NCPA made a gesture, a very small gesture,
toward conditioning some benefits of NCRPA to presences within the
United States but the qualification runs not to liability (concerning which
the "rule of reason standard" is operative) but only to damages in the
event of liability being established despite the standard's burden on
prosecutors. Shields against treble damages contemplated by federal
antitrust statutes and, at the state level, punitive or statutory treble
damages are available to joint ventures having "principal" (but, thereby,
surely not all) facilities for production27 within the United States "or its
territories"28 if the venturers choose to file a notice with designated
federal authorities.29 Assuming that a joint venture fits into the NCRPA
definition, the election to omit such a filing does not waive applicability
of the NCRPA "rule of reason standard" to the basic liability question.
Admitting that a definite article modifies "principal facilities for
production," one wonders how federal courts will distinguish "principal"
from incidental facilities when, by reference to everyday industrial
conduct, many enterprises can have multiplicities of production
"facilities" that are wholly or partially interdependent. If the damage
shield is deemed valuable (which should be resolved by a cost/benefit
analysis), venture designers will be challenged to provide hall-marks of
principality for domestic plants if there are to be plants external to the
United States. The price of avoiding treble damage exposure (providing
an appropriate "notification" to the authorities plus the location of
"principal" facilities in the United States) must be weighed against the
commercial intelligence to be provided competitors by the filing.
Sensitivity is a wonderful thing, particularly when possessed by the
powerful. However, when sensitivity replaces analysis in business or in
government, there is unsettling potential for confusion between empathy
and judgement. This is particularly true when the powerful are so caring
that they act by reference to intended beneficiaries' perceptions of
potentials for harm when the powerful understand that such perceptions
"may" depart from reality. Whether or not mischief ensues from such
patronizations depends on the nature of the action or inaction and the
circumstances in which it is indulged. Putting Congress' explicit
27. NCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 4304, amended by NCPA § 3(0.
28. NCPA § 7 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 4306).
29. NCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 4305. The U.S. Department of Justice was quick to announce
implementation of notice provisions in which the FTC concurred. U.S. Dep't of Justice Press
Release 93-177 (June 28, 1993) (on file with publisher).
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predicates3" aside, NCRPA presents a series or nice opportunities for
entrepreneurs (as well as a series of policy questions for the future).
That Congress as a whole intended no harm to the competitive
marketplace or to the integrity of "antitrust laws" must be a given. That
Congress very definitely risked such harm through not merely
"clarifying" federal antitrust principles but broadly extending
applicability of the NCRA "rule of reason standard" is remarked herein.
That recorded purposes of pertinent Committees or their members will
not in and of themselves shield against or undo bad societal results of
misguided policy embodied in NCRA, as reinforced nine years later by
NCPA, also is a given. However, counsel to entrepreneurs should
understand and advise that, just as Congress has subjected a host of
statutory provisions to a "rule of reason standard" alien to them, a later
Congress can backtrack. Should it do so, E. I. du Pont's experience
with its early investment in General Motors3 should teach that
Congress is not likely to shield, let alone indemnify, those who relied too
heavily on NCRPA or the passage of time if Congress changes the rules.
This Article is not an attack on every aspect of the policy implicitly
served by NCRPA. The author would be nothing but sympathetic with
undoing particulars of what he deems as various irrational antitrust and
FTCA precedents but the scope of his sympathy is neither limited to joint
ventures nor oriented to end runs favored by shallow office holders of
the moment focused on pleasing Political Action Committees. Bringing
us NCRPA, Congress has perpetrated an end run. Pre-existence of
ETCA and NCRA permit saying "another end run." Assuming
compatibility of a venture with the NCRPA "joint venture" definition,
Congress has relegated every substantive rule of decision in not only
federal "antitrust" but also FTCA's address to "unfair methods of
competition" and state antitrust schemes to NCRPA's "rule of reason
standard." This, anomalously, includes consumer protection content of
"unfair methods of competition" whilst curiously omitting the antitrust-
by-analogy precedent under FTCA's address to "unfair . . . trade
practices!" Addressing NCRPA, it is the author's charitable thesis that
legislators in the NCRA and NCPA vanguards, rather than being corrupt,
simply did not know what they were doing. This is not to say that
lobbyists for successive bills32 leading to the Act were similarly
ignorant but, after all, they were postulants for redress of presumed
30. NCPA § 2.
31. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 353 U.S. 586 (1957)
(Government's 1954 attack on du Pont's 1917-19 acquisition of a 23% equity position in GMC).
32. S. 1006, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); S. 479, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
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grievances in a free market for ideas and cannot be criticized if pertinent
solons, and their staffs, failed to test any given set of propositions.
There can be no credible latter day cry that lobbyists misrepresented
unless the solons were reasonable in their reliance and they have gone to
great pains to put us on notice that they were not.
What has been done can be changed only by Congress. It is not
remarked for quickly owning up to error (unless, of course, confronted
by undertakers angry with the FTC; civil service pensioners; social
security beneficiaries; or some other numerous group of voters). Thus,
the job for lawyers is to look at what Congress wrought and to consider
what avenues newly benefitted merchants now can pursue per NCRPA
without transgressing what amount to new competition rules. The
avenues are so many as to resist inventorying and this Article does no
more than indicate major boulevards.
A. Modification of Antitrust Laws' Applications
It is possible and would be somewhat true to say that NCPA did for
joint production ventures what NCRA did for joint research and
development (R&D) ventures. Such an observation would be inadequate.
As it was once possible to say of NCRA and its "rule of reason
standard," NCRPA modifies "application of federal and various state
'antitrust laws' in ways unheralded by popular reports contemporaneous
with enactment and immediately subsequent commentaries."" This has
much to do with the definitional structure of the resulting National
Cooperative Research & Production Act of 1993 (NCRPA).
What benefits are accorded those affiliated in a combination within
NCRPA's definition of a joint venture? Deferring to the organization of
the amended statute, benefits differ in nature and quality. Two - access
to the NCRPA "rule of reason standard" in the liability equation and
threatening unsuccessful private attorneys-general with costs34 - inure
to the parties to every venture falling within the NCRPA definition of a
joint venture, whereas another - limitation of injured plaintiffs to single
damages - is contingent, inter alia, upon the venturers seeing to
provision of minimal data disclosures to the U.S. Department of Justice
(DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).35
To the degree the explicit NCRPA "rule of reason standard" is
pertinent to judicial consideration of an alliance's activities under not
33. Maher & LaMont, supra note 6, at 3. For a review of NCRA's meaning more than half
of decade after passage, see Stockdale, supra note 10.
34. NCRPA, 15 U.S.C. § 4304.
35. Id. §§ 4303, 4305. See also sources cited supra note 29.
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only § 1 of the Sherman Act - with which the feared per se
characterization abbreviating the traditional rule of reason analysis
usually is associated - but also statutes concerning which per se
categorizations are alien, it must be stressed that the NCRPA "rule of
reason standard" is achieved by operation of the statutory definition
without need for filing with the DOJ and the FTC. Filing a notification
of joint venture is a condition only for achieving a limitation of
exposures in law suits to actual rather than treble or, at the state level,
other punitive damages. Consequently, the numbers and identities of
joint ventures, and venturers, that become known by reason of filings
with the DOJ and the FTC will not necessarily exhaust the list of those
entitled to the benefit of NCRPA's "rule of reason standard." Indeed,
there can be no certain list of beneficiaries. This was true of the
unmodified NCRA. The number of filings under NCRA tell nothing of
the potential number of claims to the application of its "rule of reason
standard. "36
B. Congressional Irony?
Solons can have a talent for disinformative entitling of legislative
acts. This, of course, is not peculiar to the Federal Legislature.
However, Congress is awfully good at it. Thus, of ETCA's substantive
provisions, only its Title II 3 is concerned with "export trading
companies," whereas pertinence of the "antitrust" modifications effected
by ETCA Titles II138 & IV 39 are not peculiar to export trading
companies operating under Title II. Looking only to NCPA's title (and,
previously, NCRA's title), use of the word "national" is and has been
mysterious apart from solons' pious incantations about assisting U.S.
companies in global competition. NCRA - as opposed to its
aspirational legislative history - neither encouraged only domestic
"cooperative research" nor limited benefit of the statute to businessfolk
actually or formally "American" nor encouraged R & D peculiar to
36. Per House Report No. 94 to accompany H.R. 1313, more than 300 research joint ventures
in a wide span of industries have been registered "[whereas, during] . . . 1976-1979 only 21
research joint ventures were newly formed;" H.R. REP. No. 94, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted
in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 176, 184. Clearly, this claimed success for NCRA and was indispensable
to claims that NCRA had not occasioned abuse. If success there was, it may have been far more
pronounced since access to the NCRA "rule of reason standard" was not conditioned on filing a
notification for which reason both the "300" and the "21" are suspect.
37. Maher & LaMont, supra note 6, at 3.
38. ETCA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4011-21.
39. ETCA, 96 Stat. 1246 (supplying 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1988) 15 U.S.C. § 45 (a)(3) (1988) (also
known as "Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act of 1982")).
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American enterprises. The same is true of NCRPA's major "rule of
reason standard" thrust, although there is a gesture, via only NCPA's
damage limitation provisions, to encourage employment-building
"principal" production facilities in the United States. We as a nation
don't seem to care who builds or operates those "principal" facilities
(which could represent an entirely valid policy decision but, if made, is
not one to be camouflaged by the smoke and mirrors of pious claims to
be improving the competitiveness of American industry vis-a-vis the rest
of the world). Yet, NCRA's legislative history made much of a purpose
to incentivize cooperative technological research among U.S. firms and,
thereby, to improve their competencies to participate effectively in
international competition.' NCPA's rationale is no different. That it
is possible to provide antitrust relief to firms at least formally American
was demonstrated only two years before NCRA's passage when Congress
adopted ETCA Title III.'
In 1993, Congress gave a little, just a trace, more credibility to
NCPA's use of the word "national" than was the case with NCRA.
Those production joint venturers desirous of a shield against treble
damages must not only file appropriate notices with the DOJ and the
FTC but also locate "the principal facilities for ... production" in the
United States or its territories,' Appended to this minimal price of
damage control is another condition only somewhat burdening those not
headquartered in the United States. To the degree a joint venturer is not
"a United States person" or is controlled by a "foreign person," the law
of the foreigner's base country must accord "antitrust treatment no less
favorable to United States persons than to that country's domestic
persons with respect to participation in joint ventures for production. "In
So, we now have the spectre - a remote one, asserts the author - of
federal judges sitting in antitrust cases having to deal with questions as
to whether or not a given other nation - perhaps, sub silentio - permits
or denies to American enterprise what the United States would afford
foreigners. The formal commitment of a foreign sovereign to accord the
weak reed of "national treatment" to U.S. "persons" is not a statutory
condition precedent to the applicability of the NCRPA "rule of reason
standard" to conduct of joint production ventures of, or dominated by,
foreigners. However, the DOJ is on record to the effect that the mere
40. See H.R. REP. No. 686,97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 4, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2489;
H.R. REP. No. 637(11), 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2444, 2446.
41. ETCA, 15 U.S.C. § 4021(5).
42. NCPA § 7(1) (emphasis added).
43. Id. § 7(2).
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existence of a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce & Navigation, or similar
agreement generally providing "national treatment," meets the NCPA
standard. 44
Almost parenthetically, one must assume that Chinese, Japanese,
Korean, and Thai joint venturers - initially lured to locate assembly
plants in Saipan by freedom from federal minimum wage standards -
have the capacity to qualify for the NCRPA "rule of reason standard"
even though there is no filing with the DOJ and the FTC or pretence that
explicit reciprocity is available in the venturers' base nation. Most
assuredly, foreigners desirous of the shield against treble damages (and
minimizing the ability of American taxing jurisdictions to reach
"parents" or affiliates) will see to the creation of not only ventures
possessed of U.S. juridical personalities but quite probably, intermediate
U.S. juridical persons to become investors in qualifying ventures.
Quite a different irony reposes in Congress' definition of "antitrust
laws" to include FTCA § 5(a)(1) "to the extent . . . [it] . . . applies to
unfair methods of competition."45 What a wonderful way to sweep up
all FTC precedent pre-dating 1938's Wheeler-Lea Amendments. This is
not offered with the thought that some significant part of the FTC's
consumer protectionjurisdiction has been prejudiced. The author has no
doubt that 1938's Wheeler-Lea Amendments will suffice, if needful, for
the Commission to tuck consumer protection into "unfair . . . acts or
practices" that escaped the NCRPA. But, the Wheeler-Lea Amendments
speak to more than consumer protection.46
II. Objects of Congressional Sensitivity
Before assessing benefits actually afforded joint production venturers
and considering, techniques appropriate to maximum enjoyment of
benefits afforded, the starting point is to identify Congress' beneficiaries.
To do so, it is necessary to consider NCRPA's rather lengthy description
of an encouraged joint venture.
44. U.S. Dept. of Justice Press Release 93-177 (June 28, 1993) (on file with publisher). In
this respect, the DOJ did not newly break ground. The Senate Judiciary Committee opined that "a
country . . . party to an international agreement with the United States that provides national
treatment satisfies the requirements of section 7(2)." S. REP. No. 51, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., 64
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 725, 728 (June 10, 1993).
45. NCRA. 15 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(1).
46. See supra note 21.
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A. Defining "Joint Venture"
Section 3 of NCPA47 contains a series of amendments to NCRA.
Among these are a redefinition in § 3(a) of comprehended joint ventures
and a modification in § 3(b) of excluded activities. NCRPA ordains that
"joint venture" means
any group of activities, including attempting to make, making, or
performing a contract, by two or more persons for the purpose of
(A) theoretical analysis, experimentation, or systematic study of
phenomena or observable facts,
(B) the development or testing of basic engineering techniques,
(C) the extension of investigative findings or theory of a
scientific or technical nature into practical application for
experimental and demonstration purposes, including the
experimental production and testing of models, prototypes,
equipment, materials, and processes,
(D) the production of a product, process, or service,
(E) the testing in connection with the production of a product,
process, or service by such venture,
(F) the collection, exchange, and analysis of research or
production information, or
(G) any combination of the purposes specified in subparagraphs
(A), (B), (C), (D), (E), and (F) and may include the
establishment and operation of facilities for the conducting of
such venture, the conducting of such venture on a protected and
proprietary basis, and the prosecuting of applications for patents
and the granting of licenses for the results of such venture, but
does not include any activity specified in subsection (b) of this
section.4
Subsections (D) and (E) did not appear in NCRA.
Before proceeding to NCRPA § 3(b), it should be noted. that
NCRPA's definitions section49 does not define terms such as
"phenomena," "observable facts," "basic engineering techniques,"
"scientific or technical nature," "models," "process" or "processes,"
"production" or "product," and "service" with which the "purposes" by
which a qualified joint venture are exemplified. On the face of the
matter, NCRA's references to analyses, experimentation, and systematic
47. NCPA § 3.
48. NCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(6) (emphasis added).
49. Id. § 4301(a)(1)-(5).
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study were not limited to physical as opposed to, say, psychological
phenomena. NCPA's focus on "production of a . . . service"
underscores the point. Pavlovian conditioning and other aspects of
"human engineering" were included within the overall R & D concept
benefitted by NCRA. °  NCPA did nothing to constrain such
inclusivity.5' All of the "purposes" heretofore associated with NCRA
plus "purposes" newly introduced by NCPA are fair game for the non-
exhaustive "combination of ... purposes" contemplated by NCRPA, 2
subject only to the (mostly) qualified exclusions of certain species or
activities from those permitted NCRPA venturers."
NCRPA's sixth "purpose" is particularly broad. Doesn't inclusion
of the venturers' "collection, exchange, and analysis of research or
production information" '54 embrace studies of not only customer
preferences and procurement data but also other factors of minimal if any
particular scientific or production significance albeit susceptible of
scientific collection and measurement techniques? Where to stop? Only
the explicit exclusions will tell. Primafacie, the statute encourages joint
ventures for the production of services such as banking, insurance, the
practice of law or medicine, the production of plays, and the like.55
But what of marketing the services?
Here, it is useful to consider NCRPA § 3(b) as it seeks to
particularize activities excluded from the benefitted purposes.
(b) The term "joint venture" excludes the following activities
involving two or more persons:
(1) exchanging information among competitors relating to costs,
sales, profitability, prices, marketing, or distribution of any
50. See generally Maher & LaMont, supra note 6, at 8-9.
51. But see S. REP. No. 51, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., represented at 64 Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA) 725, 727 (June 10, 1993) in which it is said that the Senate Judiciary Committee
"intends that the bill's protections will not extend to joint ventures to provide what are simply
services, such as health care or legal ..., unconnected to any concrete technological innovations,
or to joint ventures solely to purchase medical equipment." Id. (emphasis added). Of course, such
legislative history is traditionally pertinent only to the extent a statute is ambiguous. Even if the
history is regarded as limiting, how much ingenuity will be required to link joint ventures to provide
services to "concrete technological innovations?"
52. NCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(6)(G).
53. Id. § 4301(b).
54, See supra text accompanying note 48.
55. Caveat, the legislative history would have it otherwise. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 51, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) to accompany S. 5741, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 64 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 725, 727 (June 10, 1993) in which it was observed that "by including
language that covers production of services but not mere provision of a service .... [tihe Bill's
protections will not extend to joint ventures to provide what are simply services, such as health care
or legal services, that are unconnected to any concrete technological innovations . ...
LIMITED CARTELISM INVITED!
product, process, or service if such information is not
reasonably required to carry out the purpose of such venture,
(2) entering into any agreement or engaging in any other
conduct restricting, requiring, or otherwise involving the
marketing, distribution, or provision by any person who is
a party to such venture of any product, process, or
service, other than -
(A) the distribution among the parties to such venture, in
accordance with such venture, of a product, process, or
service produced by such a venture,
(B) the marketing of proprietary information, such as
patents and trade secrets, developed through such venture
formed under a written agreement entered into before the
date of enactment of the National Cooperative Production
Amendments Act of 1993, or
(C) the licensing, conveying, or transferring of intellectual
property, such as patents and trade secrets, developed
through such venture formed under a written agreement
entered into on or after the date of enactment of the
National Cooperative Production Amendments Act of
1993,
(3) entering into any agreement or engaging in any other
conduct
(A) to restrict or require the sale, licensing, or sharing of
inventions [or developments not developed through]
developments, products, processes, or services not
developed through, or produced by such venture or
(B) to restrict or require participation by any person who
is a party to such a venture in other research and
development activities,
that is not reasonably required to prevent misappropriation of
proprietary information contributed by any person who is a
party to such venture or of the results of such venture,
(4) entering into any agreement or engaging in any other
conduct allocating a market with a competitor,
(5) exchanging information among competitors relating to
production (other than production by such venture) of a product,
process, or service if such information is not reasonably
required to carry out the purpose of the venture,
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(6) entering into any agreement or engaging in any other
conduct restricting, requiring, or otherwise involving the
production (other than the production by such venture) of a
product, process, or service,
(7) using existing facilities in connection with the production of
a'product, process, or service by the venture unless the use is
for production of a new product or technology, and
(8) except as provided in paragraphs (2), (3), and (6), entering
into any agreement or engaging in any other conduct to restrict
or require participation by any person who is a party to the
venture, in any unilateral or joint activity that is not reasonably
required to carry out the purpose of the venture.56
Obviously, other than in § 3(b)(4), qualification of exclusions is the
order of the day.
Note particularly sub-sections (b)(1) and (5). Is the sole limit a
prospect of judicial applications of ejusdem generis to restrict information
exchanges to hard historical data? This could be done more easily with
(b)(1) than (b)(5). But even then, in (b)(1) use of the word "marketing"
is contraindicative in that, ultimately, pricing will be a constraint and it
must relate to projections of break-even points, minimum ultimate
satisfactory margins, and the like, which inevitably entail testing of
procurement waters. Equally surely, in the context of (b)(5), it would
be insensible to bar partners from procurement planning that is
inextricably linked to production planning but inevitably will entail
pooling data of value extrinsic to the joint venture.
Will there be an ultimate - surely not current - DOJ attempt to
restrict the availability of raw data collections, or processed versions
thereof, to the joint venture as such as opposed to the joint venturers?
Where is the statutory warrant for such a restriction? Where is it written
that a joint venture must have a legal personality or a management
distinct from the venturers? Where is it written that there must be a
"Chinese Wall" between a NCRPA joint venture and its backers? That
Congress knows how to write an unqualified exclusion is made manifest
by NCRPA § 3(b)(4), which unqualifiedly aims at good old fashioned
market allocation. It is instructive that this anti-allocation provision was
added by NCPA and should do much to flesh out the qualification in
§ 2(b)(8). If NCRPA imposes no real containment on either data
exchanges between ad hoc partners, or data back flows from the'venture
management (if there is a singular venture management) to investors,
56. NCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 4301(b)(1) (emphasis added).
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other than weak references to what is "reasonably required to carry out
the purpose of the venture" 57 in context of the glaring prohibitions of
§§ 2(b)(4) and (6), it seems that exchanges of soft and even speculative
data is encouraged in order that venturers can make sound commercial
decisions. Where, then, is the limitation against further use of such data
to a market-stultifying effect?
Let's face facts. What has been blessed is not a limited joint
venture but one able to take on anything propounded by NCRA as now
liberally supplemented by NCPA. There is no restraint against sensible
planning, execution against plan, or appraisal of interim results. There
is no restraint against partners, otherwise competitors, being frank and
open - deferring always to associational laws of the states and other
jurisdictions of organization - with data initially elicited to avoid having
the joint venture stumble into the myriad of economic traps such as
building over-capacity or walking into procurement nightmares. By
definition, such frankness - primarily ordained to the health of the
venture - will inescapably educate each sophisticated venturer in ways
pertinent to the rational conduct of its own affairs whether or not its base
line or lines of business is coincident with, complementary to, or quite
different from the joint venture's line or lines of business or those of ad
hoc partners.
Little of substance in NCRPA is peculiar to NCPA58 vice
NCRA. 59 NCPA §§ 2(b)(5) and (c)(5) added what are codified as 15
U.S.C. §§ 4301(b)(6)(D) and (E) and 4301(b)(4)-(8). Assuming proper
counseling of would-be joint venturers, there was very little data that
could not be made germane to setting policy for, or to the management
of, a joint research and development venture contemplated by NCRA.
The same is true of production joint ventures under NCRPA. The
NCPA extension does not provide against market or product extension
joint ventures. Clients' venture planning will entail identification of
opportunities; assignments of priorities among opportunities in contexts
of cost/benefit analyses of competing opportunities; and, inevitably,
discarding some opportunities while pursuing others. Is it not
conceivable that the venture's abandonment of a significant opportunity
will constitute an invitation to one or more of the venturers subject
always to making sure that there is no transgression of fiduciary duties
to the venture and other investors recognized by the incorporating or
other associational jurisdictions? What data exchanges will or should be
57. Id. § 4301(b)(1), (5), (8).
58. NCPA, 107 Stat. 177.
59. NCRA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4305.
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off limits for those planning for a joint venture who are expected, in the
normal course, to reach out for at least five or ten years? What, at a
later stage, will or should be off limits for those appraising the venture's
management? What, if a joint venture is embodied in a corporate
vehicle, will be off limits to members of the venture's board of directors
burdened by corporation codes to provide general management but
understandably chosen from employees of venturers or their affiliates?
What will be off limits to investors who take advantage of modem
corporate codes' invitations for those organizing a statutory close
corporation to dispense with a board? What, in a modem world no
longer leaning to Luddite presumptions, are "product extension" and
"market extension" anyway? Today's competitions among wood,
aluminum, steel, and vinyl for residential housing are not necessarily
tomorrow's competitions among them (and other materials of which some
may be as of yet undreamed). The very innovation that Congress
encourages will see to that, just as the unaided marketplace has in the
past.
But, query, what is to prevent any given group of persons,
otherwise competitors, from taking a page from the book of, say, the
"Beef Trust" and putting all of their new eggs into single - of course,
adequately "new" - baskets?
The definitions section of NCRPA ° incorporates the Clayton Act's
definition of "person." 6' For purposes of characterizing NCRPA joint
ventures, we know benefitted "persons" by their activities and the
purposes of those activities. It is in entrepreneurs' hands to define their
ventures purposefully and to choose the persons with whom they will
become affiliated in a NCRPA joint venture.
B. Joint Venture Vehicle - a Protected Person?
Commercial life makes it very likely but not inevitable that, while
address of NCRPA's definition of "joint venture" is to "two or more
persons" performing or attempting to perform "any group of activities"
oriented to making or performing a contract for definition and
implementation of one or more of the Congressionally invited purposes
except as given activities are excluded,62 performance of such a contract
to form a NCRPA joint venture will entail the creation of a juridical
person or other legal entity having a legal personality distinct from the
60. Id. § 4301(a)(4).
61. ETCA, 15 U.S.C. § 12(a).
62. NCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(6), 4301(b).
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venturers. Centralized planning, budgeting, procurement, allocation and
reallocation of available human and material resources, market testing,
quality and environmental controls, performance measurement, warranty
administration, and other functions of informed enterprise
management - quite without reference to the applicability of one or
more specialized regulatory schemes such as Food & Drug "food
additive" or "new drug" disciplines - will tend to mandate the definition
of discrete cost and profit centers within the overall joint venture. Quite
apart from how an investment is carried on a given venturers' books,
each venturer - for its own managerial purposes - may regard the joint
venture as a discrete cost and profit center.
Is a NCRPA joint venture itself necessarily entitled to whatever
protections NCRPA affords? It is a given that activities pertinent to
"attempting to make" a contract for a joint venture, even though
incomplete or ultimately unsuccessful, are entitled to NCRPA's "rule of
reason standard." By definition, no qualifying entity separate from the
venturers can exist until they agree and implement. What, then, of a
successful negotiation contemplating creation of a joint venture vehicle
possessed of its own legal personality? Are the consequent venture's
continued existence, its R & D activities, and its production activities
within the ambit of "any group of activities including ...performing
the" joint venture contract entitled to the NCRPA "rule of reason?"
63
To respond negatively would evoke memory of a Dickens' line as one
concludes that the NCPA amendments and the original NCRA structure
are almost- pointless. The privilege of burdening a prosecutor with the
NCRPA "rule of reason standard" is given to the "two or more persons"
who made and are performing the "contract." What if the venture is so
successful that each investor becomes a relatively silent partner, inactive
in day-to-day, quarter-to-quarter management but very much a player
when it comes to board-level long-range planning and policy definition?
Congress did not see fit to ordain that venturers must operate
through the equivalent of a general partnership lest they forfeit the "rule
of reason standard" afforded a qualifying "venture." NCPA amended
the NCRA "rule of reason standard"' but surely did .not limit it.
NCRPA negates application of per se rules to the existence and
operations of defined ventures as it ordains a "rule of reason standard"
for appraisal of "the conduct of any person ... making or performing"
a contract to carry out defined R & D and production activities.'
63. See infra text accompanying note 83.
64. NCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 4302.
65. Id.
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Thus, assuming proper draftsmanship of the base contract by which the
venture is granted, persons (including an incorporated joint venture
vehicle) literally performing the contract should be protected for purposes
of at least the NCRPA "rule of reason standard." Is this a sufficiently
satisfying reed?
As noted earlier, nothing in NCRPA precludes use of associational
laws to confer a juridical personality on a vehicle embodying a qualifying
joint venture. Indeed, in order to permit operation "on a protected and
proprietary basis" including unitary licensing,' such organization seems
implicitly encouraged. Surely, prosecuting patent applications and
licensing technology on behalf of a joint venture would be convenienced
by embodying the venture in a entity unquestionably capable of
performing legal acts for its own account. Even if encouragement is not
all that glaring, it seems obvious that all functions of a jointly-owned
vehicle are themselves "activities" of the contracting parties plainly
within the scope of the NCRPA definition of "joint venture." At later
points,67 it is urged that prudent counseling will see to the creation of
an entity, embodying the venture's cost and profit centers, that itself is
capable of becoming party to the venturers' base contract and does so
with the consequence that it is one of those "making" as well as
"performing" the overall agreement.
What of the therapy implicit in the conditional limitation of private
parties to single damages? Present address to it only subsumes that a
given set of joint venturers may consider such a contingent benefit worth
the disclosures to the world implicit in public filings when such filings
are not themselves conditions precedent to operation, in the liability
equation, of the NCRPA "rule of reason standard."" Insulation of the
joint venture vehicle from punitive damages is less certain since the
statutory approach to the limitation of damages (and the provision of
costs-for-prevailing-party) are less explicit than is the explication of the
"rule of reason standard." To the degree that the availability of the
treble damage shield is deemed important, it would seem important for
not only the venturers but, as substantial investments are made in a
66. Id. § 4301(a)(6)(G).
67. See infra text accompanying notes 69, 70, 280.
68. The writer suggests that there may be sufficient commercial intelligence value in some
disclosures required by filing "a notification" as to discourage filings in various circumstances.
NCRA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4303, 4305. Foregoing relatively minor benefits associated with filings may
not represent a significant cost to discreet folks who nonetheless are entitled to application of the
NCRPA "rule of reason standard" with would-be plaintiffs threatened by the spectre of costs if
unsuccessful. Id. § 4304.
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venture having a legal personality distinct from its investors, for the
vehicle itself.
The treble damage shield does not specify persons to whom it is
available. Rather, the shield looks to compensable injuries caused by
offensive conduct that is within "the scope of a notification" filed with
the DOJ and the FTC.69 According to NCRPA, such notifications can
be filed by "any party to a joint venture, acting on such venture's
behalf."7I Assuming a filing, it is easy to argue - and those plaintiffs
who succeed in establishing liability despite NCRPA's "rule of reason
standard" surely will argue - that (a) "joint venture" is a term of art
embracing only activities of persons contracting to bring ventures into
existence and thereafter to maintain them; (b) the detrebling provision
should be construed strictly; and (c) Congress intended only to encourage
collaborations by principals rather than their creatures' excesses (e.g.,
violation by a joint venture vehicle of the Robinson-Patman Act's
strictures on discrimination in price or merchandising supports among
competitors of the buyer). A defendant vehicle's first line of response
will stress that the contemplated filing is "on such venture's behalf."
Secondarily, it will be urged that the Act's overall definition of venture
focuses on activities pursuant to a contract oriented to one or more
explicitly permitted purposes and that the treble damage shield runs to
conduct described in the filed notification by whomsoever performed so
long as it is on behalf of a qualifying venture.
Note that the filing is of a notification concerning "nature and
objectives" that, unlike an application for a COR under ETCA Title III,
need not detail specific operations. All of this commends that counsel
to venturers, if use of an institutionalized joint venture vehicle is
important to the intended activities, not only cause the "notification" to
include organization and operation of the vehicle (as part of the venture's
"nature" evoked by NCRPA7") but, as part of formalizing the overall
inter-venturer agreement, cause the vehicle to become a party to the
basic contract and to clause the initial and all subsequent filings
accordingly. It would seem that a joint ventured production vehicle
embodied in a limited partnership or a business trust almost inevitably
must become a party to the base contract. This is not true of an
incorporated venture vehicle. Obvious reasons for causing it to be a
formal party are that it is better to insure the availability of the "rule of
reason standard" for its unilateral conduct as well as to secure limitation
69. NCRA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4303, 4305(a).
70. Id. § 4305(a) (emphasis added).
71. Id. § 4305(a)(2).
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to single damages. That there are thrusts of "antitrust laws" that, in the
fullness of time, a successful NCRPA-qualified joint venture may seem
to ignore - deliberately or unthinkingly - is a given. That is the point
of NCRPA. Typically, once a qualifying venture is well beyond start-
up, investors will not be involved in low-level decisions as to whether or
not, e.g., the "meeting competition" defense to a potential price
discrimination charge is available. Yet, proper homework will insulate
all concerned.
Boot-strapping? Putting aside the significance of having the vehicle
become a party to the base contract, those defending the conduct of a
joint venture - that ultimately is held liable despite the NCRPA "rule
of reason standard" - will argue that the use of the phrase "acting on
such venture's behalf' is simple English plainly indicative of a remedial
purpose to shield all activities within the "nature and objectives" of the
venture, including its formal manifestation, disclosed in the notification
to the DOJ and the FTC. Such an argument might run afoul of strict
construction. However, if a suitably formalized vehicle is literally a
party to the basic contract undertaken within the scope of NCRPA's joint
venture definition, it will be most difficult for a court to conclude that
the vehicle is unentitled to invoke each and every protection afforded its
own investors.
C. Conduct Within NCRPA's Safe Harbors
What does NCPA shield? To the definitional structure of NCRA,
NCPA added "production of a product, process or service . . . testing
in connection with the production of a product, [and] process or service
by such venture." 72 It is a given that conduct in realms beyond
production, literally understood, is comprehended.
Earlier, NCRA created a nice question as to whether routinized
marketing of a product from a prototypical (but beyond bench-scale)
plant was entitled to the original "rule of reason standard" so long as the
joint R & D venturers continued tinkering with the plant; i.e., when the
production process never would emerge from "development," which is
a condition not at all uncommon in the production of chemicals. NCPA
put an end to such speculation by, purely and simply, encouraging
production joint ventures. It is clear that, subject to an explicit limitation
flowing from fears that venturers might proceed from orienting a joint
venture's market exploitation to extra-venture market allocation,73
72. Id. § 4301(a)(G),(D),(E).
73. Id. § 4301(b)(4).
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NCRPA allows collaborative approaches to everything from basic
technological and market research through the marketing output of the
full-scale production of goods or services. The only obvious hook,
beyond fears of anti-competitive conduct extrinsic to proper needs of the
investors qua joint venturers, is the exclusionary language of NCRPA's
§ 3(b)(7), as it provides against the use of "existing facilities in
connection with the production of a product [or] process of service...
unless the use is for the production of a new product or technology." 74
Recall that such facilities need not be in the United States if only the
NCRPA "rule of reason standard" is desired. This might provoke
speculation as to underlying policy. Why did Congress opt to benefit
(and thereby encourage) use of plants "for the production of a new
product or technology" outside of as well as within the United States?
Only the damage shield looks to requiring that "principal" facilities be
in the United States. A principled basis for the distinction is not at all
clear. Only after a finding of liability in a damage action does the
location of "principal" facilities come into issue when, of course, there
has been an appropriate filing of a notification of a NCRPA joint
venture.
As suggested earlier, preclusion of "existing facilities" unless for a
new product or for using new technology raises some questions. The
first is troublesome. NCRPA's focus on "existing facilities" is not
explicitly limited to prior ownership by a party to the joint venture.
Thus, on the face of the matter, it appears that an otherwise qualifying
venture's purchase of a pre-existing plant from a third party does not free
the venture to continue the seller's use of the plant although such use
may be entirely new to the venturers. The limitation explicitly addresses
the facilities themselves vice historic ownership. So, the scenario seems
the same whether or not a pre-existing plant is acquired from a third
party or is contributed by a venturer. However, let it be said that the
legislative history clearly contemplates the conversion of facilities
previously owned by one of the venturers.75 Will courts be kind
74. Id. § 4301(b)(7) (emphasis added).
75. See S. REP. No. 51, 103d Cong., 1st. Sess., reprinted in 64 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) 725, 727-28 (June 10, 1993).
"The new product or technology" qualification was incorporated to limit . . . use of
existing facilities to those joint ventures intending to produce or process a product not
currently being produced or processed at that facility, or to those intending to use a new,
innovative technology to produce or process an existing type of product .... However,
a process ... will not qualify as "new" solely . . .[because] the ... venture produces
...more efficiently or cheaply by using existing facilities.
Id. (emphasis added).
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enough to infer the existence of a "their" in the statutory language so
that § 3(b)(7) effectively refers to "using their existing facilities,"
thereby treating facilities newly-acquired by or for an otherwise
qualifying joint venture as sufficiently "new" as to end the enquiry? One
should not invest substantial dollars in reliance on an affirmative answer.
Let's look at a hypothetical operating situation. Let us pre-suppose
that American company A has been manufacturing aqueous solutions of
formaldehyde at several plants each having about the same production
capacity. Let us further assume that contained water in the solutions
have been at levels of 10%, 20%, 30%, and 40% well known and
accepted as distinct commodities in merchant markets in which A is an
established seller. Now comes Canadian party B, one of A's occasional
customers for 40% material, suggesting a joint investment in a Mexican
plant to become B's essentially captive supplier of formaldehyde for use
as a raw material in others of its Central American manufacturing
operations. B's take from the Mexican plant would approximate the
current capacity of one of A's existing U.S. plants. There is a suitable
plant for sale in Mexico, which has been producing 30% material.
Marketing lawyers, familiar with Robinson-Patman practice,76 will be
quick to ask if party B can take a 35 % or 45 % solution as opposed to the
40% one it has been using and, if so, whether or not party A could
easily gear the Mexican plant to produce such a "new" solution? If a
35 % or 45 % solution is unknown in merchant markets (although easy to
manufacture) and B is willing to take 35% material, would a Mexican-
produced 35% solution be a "new product" for purposes of NCRPA?
There is a physical difference albeit almost fanciful. When Congress
looked to "new" products or technologies," it did not ordain that every
"new" product or technology must be remarkably different from existing
materials. More importantly, a new product need not be free from
competing materials.7 Would the answer change if there are other
folks in the world who could use 35 % solutions but A hitherto elected
not to solicit purchasers? Seemingly not.
76. Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a)-(f). This surely does not suggest that the author
considers § 2(a) of the Clayton Act to be applicable to sales of goods made abroad when they are
sold abroad. Section 2(a) is concerned only with commodities sold for domestic resale or
consumption.
77. Indeed, the legislative history suggests otherwise. Thus, the Senate report would bless
(a) steel venturers' use of "their" pre-existing facilities to use "a new and innovative technology for
manufacturing steel;" (b) chip manufacturers who "integrated facilities ... [hitherto used to] . . .
produce chips by ... optical lithography ... [to] . . . joint venture using x-ray lithography;" and
(c), most tellingly, semiconductor manufacturers' collaboration to upgrade from one and four MB
chips to a "16 megabyte chip." S. Rep. No. 51, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 64 Antitrust
& Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 725, 527 (June 10, 1993).
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Would a 35 % solution produced by a joint venture of A and B at
A's former U.S. plant #9, now conveyed to the incorporated A & B joint
venture vehicle, be sufficiently "new" to achieve access to the NCRPA
"rule of reason standard" in all respects? Seemingly so. Would the
answer differ if the A & B joint venture sold 35 % material to not only
B but also third parties for use in the United States and discriminated in
price against B's competitors? For purposes of NCRPA, seemingly not
even though there might be a Robinson-Patman count newly subject, of
course, to the NCRPA "rule of reason standard."
It is easy enough to say that commercial worth of various products,
and the processes which bring them into being, can be gauged only by
permitting the marketplace to test materials yielded by a venture, but this
proposition would require that every "new product" be tendered in the
merchant market which surely is not demanded by NCRPA. It is a given
that superficially identical organic chemicals or man-made fibers
produced by different processes frequently prove to be anything but
fungible, having different commercially significant handling
characteristics when introduced to process machinery of customers for
such intermediates. In the immediately foregoing example, if B takes
100% of the production of the "joint venture" from A's former U.S.
plant #9 now owned by the A & B joint venture, there can be no
judgement of the marketplace as to whether or not a 35% or 45%
solution is a distinct and, therefore, new product. Yet, there will be a
physically "new product" in terms of A's former approach to
manufacturing and B's former approach to procuring intermediate
materials. In other antitrust contexts, mere physical differences do not
necessarily rate respect as more than fanciful in the absence of a
demonstration of demand for the differentiated product.
In any event, while Congress obviously hoped to promote significant
innovations by joint production ventures, statutory language, as opposed
to legislative history, does not make it clear that joint ventures to
produce upgraded versions of tried-and-true products and services are
beyond the purview of the Act's benefits so long as what is produced, or
the technology used to produce it, is "new" to the facility central to the
process! This is underscored by the Senate Judiciary Committee's
willingness to accept a twenty-four megabyte chip as new to producers
of lesser megabyte chips.78 Products and services new to a joint
venturer need not be new to the world economy. In its focus on pre-
existing facilities, Congress did not evoke a showing that there is
78. Id.
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something definitely new under the sun.79 Therefore, courts hopefully
will not honor plaintiffs' demands to require those who would rely on a
product or service being "new" to demonstrate its novelty vis-a-vis the
would. If new only in the sense of setting up an additional resource, the
social virtue would be to add an actual or potential competitor. It is not
unusual to demand that those claiming the benefit of an exemption prove
its availability. If venturers are required to prove entitlement to the
NCRPA "rule of reason standard" by reference to the novelty of a
product or service produced at a pre-existing facility or the novelty of the
technology employed, they probably will be required to distinguish
substance from form. If they are so burdened, there will be a
considerable albeit indirect disincentive to set up joint production
ventures using one or more of the parties' pre-existing facilities for the
purpose of producing mere upgrades of products or services lest the
venturers fail to carry the burden of proving entitlement to exemption
from unmodified application of rules otherwise watered by the NCRPA
"rule of reason standard." However, let it be said that Congress' belief
that a twenty-four megabyte chip is "new" compared to a one or
four-megabyte chip is a nice start for venturers willing to gamble on
mere upgrades being sufficiently "new."
III. NCRPA Rule of Reason
Are availabilities of the NCRA "rule of reason standard" as
modified by NCPA and limitation of damages matters of concern in a
real world? "Rule of Reason" is an antitrust term of art usually having
meaning only in the context of judicial applications of §§ 1 and 3 of the
Sherman Act and their state analogues. The mere organization or
existence of a joint venture for purposes other than those which are fairly
and clearly anticompetitive has never been characterized as offensive per
se to the Sherman Act or any other federal antitrust norm. Congress
knew that no production joint venture had been held offensive per se to
the Sherman Act.' Thus, a quick reference to NCRPA's "rule of
reason standard" might seem to suggest that its principal contribution is
79. S. REP. No. 51, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 64 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. 725
(June 10, 1993), is quite charitable in this respect. While not impressed with a plant that merely
permits production "more efficiently or cheaply" than existing facilities, examples run to both use
of techniques new to venturers and production of upgrades "new" to venturers' product lines. Id.
at 727. The House Judiciary Committee wrote to the same effect. H.R. REP. No. 94, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess., reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 176.
80. "Under current law, production joint ventures are generally subject to rule-of-reason
analysis . . . ." S. REP. No. 51, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 64 Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA) 725, 729 (June 10, 1993).
LIMITED CARTELISM INVITED!
redundancy, in terms of the 1993 Act's "findings," purely for
"clarification."81 The Senate Judiciary Committee indulged an
unobjectionable incantation to preserve "rule-of-reason" analysis for
production ventures.' From this it would be permissible to infer that
the principal real contributions of NCRPA lie in the conditional
detrebling therapy as well as in inducing a certain paranoia in possible
private plaintiffs concerning their potential for being assessed the full
costs of unsuccessful prosecutions. If these were the sole "benefits" of
NCRPA, it would be appropriate to ignore its "rule of reason standard"
and to proceed immediately to develop meaningfulness in limitation of
liability and allocation of costs. But such is not the case. The quick
appraisal would be incorrect and the inference fallacious.
A. "Rule of Reason Standard"
The NCRPA "rule of reason standard" is not a mere clarification.
The standard's language must be considered:
In any action under the antitrust laws, or under any State law similar
to the antitrust laws, the conduct of any person in making or
performing a contract to carry out a joint venture shall not be deemed
illegal per se; such conduct shall be judged on the basis of its
reasonableness, taking into account all relevant factors affecting
competition, including, but not limited to, effects on competition in
properly defined, relevant research, development, product, process,
and service markets. For the purpose of determining a properly
defined, relevant market, worldwide capacity shall be considered to
the extent it is appropriate in the circumstances.'
NCRPA clearly imposes its "rule of reason standard" on much more
than the mere organization and operation of ventures defined in NCRA
as amended by NCPA. The standard mandates "relevant factors" for
rule of reason analyses of persons' conduct under all implicated antitrust
laws and strongly orients but does not mandate fact finders to consider
global markets. However, consider the definition of "antitrust laws" set
forth in NCRPA.
The NCRPA rule of reason does not address simply §§ 1 and 3 of
the Sherman Act. Anomalously, the NCRPA rule of reason implicates
federal statutes to which per se formulae are quite foreign (see, for
example, §§ 2, 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act as well as "unfair methods of
81. NCPA § 2(a)(3).
82. S. REP. No. 51, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 64 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) 725, 729 (June 10, 1993).
83. NCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 4302 (emphasis added).
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competition" made unlawful by § 5(a)(1) of FTCA). The principal
thrusts of Clayton §§ 2 and 3 are directed toward the activities of sellers
in the domestic marketplace although buyers have some exposure and
export trade may be implicated by sub-parts of § 2. Section 7's principal
thrust is at the acquisition of significant assets. Nothing in Clayton §§
2 and 3, or FTCA § 5(a)(1) focuses peculiarly on joint ventures. Of
these, only Clayton §§ 2(a), 2(f), 3, and 7 demand some proof of the
probability of competitive injury. None of them demand proof of an
anticompetitive purpose. The standard itself explicitly implicates state
laws "similar" to federal ones as defined in NCRPA and does so without
providing a criterion for marking similarity. Thus, various states' "little
FTC Acts," essentially collections of early FTC precedent, are as
subordinated to the NCRPA "rule of reason standard" as are "little
Sherman Acts" and idiosyncratic state antitrust statutes. What of
antitrust rules that do not dictate any focus whatsoever on either purpose
or competitive injury?' Consider the breadth of FTC consumer
protection precedent as it focuses on "unfair methods of competition."'
Assuming that there is a valid policy ground for cutting NCRPA joint
ventures a break under, for example, §§ 2, 3, and 7 of the Clayton Act,
a policy not explained by the pertinent committees, what can be the
principled basis for undercutting FTC precedent protecting children from
lottery merchandising?
So much for "clarification." These not so rhetorical questions also
suggest why great pains are taken in this Article to refer to the "rule of
reason standard" set forth in NCRPA as distinct from the rule of reason
classically associated with §§ 1 and 3 of the Sherman Act. Only under
§ 1 of the Sherman Act and various state statutes identical or
substantially similar to it have courts characterized certain species of
conduct as offensive per se. Joint ventures, production or otherwise,
never have been characterized as offensive per se to the Sherman Act.
It must be a given that the existence of a joint venture or other
combination is an element of proof in a Sherman § 1 (or § 3) case. Yet
"antitrust laws" is a term NCRPA liberally defines to embrace not only
the Sherman Act and import-oriented antitrust provisions of the Wilson
Tariff Act (which are similar to the Sherman Act) but also the Clayton
Act and FTCA § 5 "to the extent that [FTCA § 5(a)(1)] ... applies to
84. See, e.g., Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(c), (d), (e).
85. And, by all means, do not omit considering NCRPA's deliberate omission of FrCA
§ 5(a)(1)'s address to "unfair ... acts or practices," which, although it should be considered by
antitrusters in context of FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson, 405 U.S. 233, 244-45(1972), also has a
considerable consumer protection dimension.
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unfair methods of competition" that are operative whether or not there
is a conspiracy or combination.' NCRPA makes no distinction among
legal, equitable, administrative, and criminal applications of the defined
"antitrust laws." Similarly, there is no distinction between administrative
remedies immediately available to the FTC staff and matters originally
cognizable by courts. There is no explicit pretense that any portion of
FTCA is to be regarded as one of the "antitrust laws" for purposes other
than NCRPA, although all FTCA "unfair methods of competition" are
within the NCRPA address to "antitrust laws" - even the precedent
concerning consumer protection. The author is quick to admit that
ETCA similarly embraced the "unfair methods of competition" language
of FTCA (1) as one of the "antitrust laws" for purposes of the somewhat
shielding "Certificates of Review" contemplated by ETCA Title 1it
7
and (2) in the jurisdiction-affecting ETCA Title IV. From this, the
author infers that the omission of "unfair or deceptive acts or practices"
from NCRPA's restriction of FTCA's sweep is deliberate albeit
unexplained."
The overall effect of the NCRPA "rule of reason standard," in the
context of the definition of "antitrust laws," is remarkable. For
example, most substantive provisions of the Clayton Act condemn
particularized species of conduct without necessary reference to actors'
purposes 9 and some Clayton proscriptions dispense with the need to
prove anti-competitive effects.' Yet, excepting only §§ 7 and 8 of the
Clayton Act, no substantive provisions of the Clayton Act have any great
potential relevance to the formation and operation of joint ventures
generally, let alone those defined by NCRPA. It goes without saying
that FTC jurisprudence is not marked with great respect for the rule of
reason as is known to the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court has
encouraged FTC concern with conduct that represents only an incipient
violation of antitrust laws writ large.9' Nonetheless, if the NCRPA
"rule of reason standard" is applicable to challenged conduct, prosecutors
of FTCA "unfair methods of competition," Clayton, and Sherman Act
86. NCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(1).
87. ETCA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4021, 45(a)(3).
88. The ludicrous NCRPA effect on early FTC consumer protection is not so glaring in ETCA
Title III by reason of the detail that must be indulged by applicants for Certificates of Review, but
then ETCA did not include the FTC in the process of reviewing applications for CORs. See ETCA,
15 U.S.C. § 4016(a).
89. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 12, 13, 18, 19 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
90. See 15 U.S.C. § 12(c), (d), (e).
91. See, e.g., FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 320-22 (1966) in context of FTC v.
Sperry & Hutchinson, 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
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theories will be in the same boat. All of these prosecutors will be
burdened to make out a case in the context of the "rule of reason
standard" including anti-competitive effects in relevant R & D or
production markets with Congress having a bit more than hinted that the
relevant geographic market in which to judge "capacity" is global.'
NCRPA's buckshot approach differs dramatically from what now
seem rifle shot provisions implicit in the Sherman and FTC Act
jurisdictional tests affected by ETCA Title IV93 as well as the
substantively-oriented but administratively-controlled availability of a
Certificate of Review (COR) under ETCA Title III.' Unlike the
approach adopted in ETCA Title III (which also burdened prosecutors of
not only federal but also state "antitrust" theories), the NCRA and
NCPA approaches have worked effective albeit indirect amendment of
all "antitrust laws" in so far as they otherwise would apply to the
formation and everyday activities of joint ventures oriented to purposes
blessed by NCRPA.
Assuming a jurisdictional nexus, the point of classic per se
condemnations' under § 1 of the Sherman Act is to relieve prosecutors
from developing the malign purposes of the actors, or the highly
probable anti-competitive consequences of their conduct, in connection
with price stabilization and other well-recognized forms of market
rigging in unexceptional industries with which courts consider that they
have had considerable experience.' The "performing" language of
NCRA's § 3, unchanged by NCPA, provoked a question as to whether
or not it undid per se doctrines to the degree they ordinarily impact
licensing of venture-developed technology. The question of whether or
not NCRA opened the barn door in the case of, e.g., phony brokerage
applications of § 2(c) of the Clayton Act' was interesting but not as
glaringly important. The effect of NCRPA, as it implicitly invites
marketing by a qualifying joint venture, heightens interest concerning the
effect on addresses of §§ 21' and 399 of the Clayton Act to marketing
techniques as well as the importance of questions as to how the NCRPA
92. NCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 4302.
93. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6a, 45(a)(3) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
94. ETCA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4011-4015.
95. The author regards price-fixing and horizontal market-allocation per-se doctrines as
"classic" but not tying and group boycott doctrines, which can demand proof of defendant's power
and purpose.
96. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, U. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
97. 15 U.S.C. § 13(c).
98. 15 U.S.C. § 13.
99. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1988).
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"rule of reason standard" impacts § 7 of the Clayton Act"° and FTCA
§ 5(a)(1).' 0 '
B. Sherman Act Implications
Remarking on NCRPA, there is little point in dwelling on a chicken
or egg problem concerning which of the "rule of reason" or "per se"
doctrine is the essential expression of § 1 of the Sherman Act. Similarly,
in context of the 1993 Act, there is no great virtue in complaining about
a history of judicial inclusions within the catalogue of per se offenses of
conduct economically less threatening than competitors' price-fixing or
market allocations. Since Congress saw fit to subject all prosecutions of
NCRA ventures' qualifying activities to the NCRPA "rule of reason
standard," no great time and space need be devoted to distinguishing
between conduct usually entitled to traditional "rule of reason" analyses
under §§ 1 and 3 of the Sherman Act and conduct usually characterized
as offensive per se to the Act. Reflection concerning how "relevant
factors" commended for use by NCRPA adjudicators affect statutes other
than the Sherman Act will make it very clear that the 1993 Congress
indulged more than psychic therapy. Nonetheless, some address to
Sherman § 1 decisions is apropos for purposes of background.
1. Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.-Focusing on § 1 of the
Sherman Act before there was an ETCA or NCRPA, it goes without
saying that prosecution always postulates a joint venture of some sort.
Section 1 addresses restraints on trade effected by "contract, combination
or conspiracy, " "°2 and the existence of one of them is a
jurisdictional fact. Assuming that a combination is admitted or proven,
a traditional "rule of reason" prosecutor - if unassisted by precedent
confirming the clear availability of a per se characterization of the
conduct in question - has the burden of establishing an anti-competitive
principal purpose of those alleged to have agreed on a course of conduct
or the probability of the conduct's adverse effect on competition.0 3
Additionally, if the prosecutor is a private person proceeding under §§
4 or 16 of the Clayton Act,"° he or she must establish the injury to
"business or property" experienced or to be experienced by the plaintiff.
100. 15 U.S.C. § 18.
101. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).
102. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
103. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238-39 (1918).
104. 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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Although a more recent decision of the Supreme Court may have
changed the ultimate burden on triers of fact by a hair,' °5 Justice
Brandeis' opinion in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States continues
to be the leading elucidation of the rule of reason:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To
determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts
peculiar to the business, . . . its condition before and after the
restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual
and probable. The history of the restraint .... the purpose or ends
sought to be attained, are all relevant .... This is not because good
intention will save an achieved objectionable regulation or the
reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court to
interpret facts and to predict consequences."101
The Chicago Board arrangement entailed limited price freezes measured
in hours or weekends as incidents of a larger self-regulatory scheme
among persons otherwise competitors in the grain pits. The purpose was
to provide an even playing field in the sense of competing commodities
traders' access to knowledge of pertinent commodities' market prices and
availabilities. 107
Assuming an absence of joint venturers' anticompetitive purpose,
Brandeis guided us to look beyond immediate effects to the probability
that a restraint would come to injure competition.' This served a
later epitomization to the effect that the Sherman Act is predicated upon
a conviction that "unrestrained interaction of competitive forms will yield
the best allocation of ... resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality
105. Nat'l Soc'y of Prof. Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 686-96 (1978).
106. Chicago Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238.
107. The decades-later Professional Engineers decision mayhap unconsciously refined the
purpose of the rule of reason analysis to determination of whether the restraint in question has the
net effect of promoting or suppressing the competitive process. Nat'l Soc'y of Prof. Engineers, 433
U.S. at 688-96. Before Professional Engineers, it was common to rely on Chicago Board for the
short-hand proposition that the rule of reason condemns only arrangements that "on balance" are
anti-competitive. It continues arguable that Professional Engineers does not prejudice the essentially
neutral restraint that improbably promotes or suppresses the competitive process. In any event,
decisions after Chicago Board tend to adhere to the view that a rule of reason analysis condemns
an agreement that has the purpose or the likely effect of substantially reducing competition. There
is no broad adherence to a philosophy tolerating restraints prejudicing competition because they are
complemented by aspirations to achieve some higher good. Professional Engineers' concern with
a net effect did not alter the theme. Indeed, language in the 1984 NCAA v. University of Oklahoma
decision reflected a disposition to honor Brandeis' approach. NCAA v. U. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85.
108. See supra text accompanying note 106.
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and the greatest material progress."" 9 Has Brandeis' rule of reason
been modified by NCRPA?
One might infer that the NCRPA "rule of reason standard" narrows
litigatory focus to actual effects on competition. This has to do with the
command that "factors" to be considered include "effects on
competition.""' The author has no such illusion and urges that others
avoid it. He submits that the invocation by NCRPA's "rule of reason
standard" of "all relevant factors affecting competition" and its prior
reference to judging conduct "on the basis of its reasonableness" do not
narrow the Chicago Board approach. Factors "affecting competition"
inevitably include not only venturers' purposes and the actual impacts of
their conduct but also the probable effects on pertinent markets of the
R & D or production venture. Actual effects are included among factors
to be considered but the inclusion is explicitly non-limiting. While it is
inescapable that NCRPA also orients fact finders to actual "effects...
in . . .relevant .'. . markets," equally inescapable is that Congress took
care to indicate that the total analysis is "not limited" to such effects in
R & D and production markets."'
Resort to legislative history (which, the author suggests, is not
necessary at this juncture), leaves no doubt that Congress' particularity
with the NCRA "rule of reason standard" was intended to guide courts
"in focusing on the major potential anticompetitive and procompetitive
effects of" comprehended ventures. 1I2 The pertinent committees did
not suggest that significant anticompetitive effects can be offset by good
intentions concerning (or good effects in) contexts other than
competitive. NCPA did not change the NCRA "rule of reason standard"
in particulars suggesting a change of mind in the nine years since the
latter's passage. Those disquieted by the potential for ordaining a rule
of reason that burdens courts with identifying desirable societal goals
(other than the promotion of competition), and weighing such goals
against injuries to the competitive process, will not be happy with the
legislative history's allusions to economies of scale."3  Unhappiness
109. No. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
110. See supra text accompanying note 83.
111. See supra text accompanying note 83.
112. Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee or the Conference, H.R. Rep. No. 1044,
98th Cong. 2d Sess. 9.
113. "Agreements that go to the heart of competition, such as ... [the preclusion of] ...
parties. from competing with the venture or accomplishing objectives similar to the venture
independently, should be reviewed carefully to determine if they have a valid efficiency
justification." S. REP. No. 51, 103d Cong. 1st Sess., reprinted in 64 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) 725, 729 (June 10, 1993). But, contrast this thought with an observation that a process or
technology "will not qualify as 'new' solely by virtue ... [of producing] ...a product more
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may be leavened by recognition that, on an explicit level, the NCRPA
"rule of reason standard" neither commends nor otherwise purports to
authorize courts to balance other values against the protection of the
competitive process. However, the NCRPA "rule of reason standard"
makes very clear what NCRA only implied; i.e., courts are to be
constantly aware that we now live in a global economy. 4  Such
awareness, of course, does not undo either the wealth of precedent
concerning subject matter jurisdiction under the Sherman Act" 5 or
need, in the event non-importing foreign commerce of the United States
is involved, to respect the effect of ETCA's Title IV on courts' Sherman
Act jurisdiction. 116
2. Import of NCRPA Definitional Exclusions &
Qualifications.-What of conduct ordinarily offensive per se to § 1 of the
Sherman Act? No labeled inroads are made on per se doctrines but
nonetheless there are inroads! Consider, e.g., price-restricted licenses
among qualifying NCRPA venturers otherwise subject to the per se rule
of United States v. Line Material."7 The manner in which NCRPA
qualifies "exclusions" of various activities"8 from the definition of
"joint research and development venture" is provocative both in isolation
and, more appropriately, in the context of the basic "joint venture"
definition's liberality. NCRPA § 2(b) is concerned with limiting
"activities" of defined venturers. However, it has other implications.
Thus, while NCRPA § 2(a)(6) never mentions marketing," 9 § 2(b) not
only mentions marketing but deals with it by seeming to constrict it. 20
efficiently or cheaply by using existing faculties." Id. at 727. The first sentence is in the
concluding paragraph of a reverie concerning a solution for "antitrust uncertainty."
114. NCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 4302.
115. "[W]orldwide capacity ... [is not intended to] ... be accorded any special weight in the
balancing of all relevant factors. In some cases, worldwide capacity ...may have little or no
relevance" to market definition. H.R. REP. No. 94, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. 176, 191-92.
116. 15 U.S.C. § 6a.
117. United States v. Line Material, 333 U.S. 287 (1948).
118. NCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 4301(b).
119. See supra text accompanying note 48.
120. NCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 4301(b)(2). Note, in House Judiciary Committee Report No. 94 to
accompany H.R. 1313, a disclaimer of intent to include "marketing collaboration as a type of
activity eligible for . . . protections of . . .NCRA with proper disclosure." H.R. REP. No. 94,
reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 187. However, what the same committee styled a "marketing
exclusion" is set forth at NCPA § 2(b)(2) and it looks to not only marketing of intellectual property
but also "distribution among the parties of that produced by the venture." NCPA § 2(b)(2)
(amending 15 U.S.C. § 4301(b)(2)).
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Note that most of the eight NCRPA § 2(b) exclusions are qualified
and that all but the limitation on use of "existing facilities" deal with
activities that can occasion a brush with antitrust principles. Potencies
for the explicit qualifications to accommodate venturers' evasion of
otherwise strong antitrust Act policies, or otherwise to burden
prosecutions under § 1 of the Sherman Act, are considered at this point.
a. Nature of Exclusions.-The first exclusion, set forth at NCRPA
§ 2(b)(1),"' qualifiedly addresses competitors' exchanges of costs,
prices, and other sensitive data. The exclusion relates to United States
v. Container Corporation"2 and various DOJ policy statements.
13
-The principal thrust of the second exclusion is qualifiedly to prohibit
conduct "restricting, requiring, or otherwise involving the marketing,
distribution or provision by any . . . party to . . .[the] . ..venture of
any product, process or service" other than the distribution "among the
parties ... of a product, process or service produced by" the venture or
marketing its proprietary data. 24 It provokes thought of not only
allocative, tying, and resale price maintenance per se doctrines under § 1
of the Sherman Act but also the strictures of § 3 of the Clayton Act.
Focusing on distribution of a venture's production "among" the
venturers, can the distribution be for resale? There is no restraint on
resale. Neither is there a restraint on the agreement for distribution
"among" the parties providing for how resale is to be accomplished -
if it is - except as the fourth exclusion unqualifiedly bans market
allocations.
The third exclusion also is qualified. It excludes restraints imposed
in connection with transfers of "inventions, developments, products
processes or services" generated outside of the agreed venture as well as
restraints on other R & D efforts of parties to the venture."2 This has
more than an occult relationship to various per se applications concerning
not only tying in intellectual property areas but also technology transfers
generally. The fourth exclusion, unqualified, simply excludes "allocating
a market" with a competitor. Presumably, this reads on territorial,
customer, and use allocations often treated as offensive per se to § 1 of
121. See supra text accompanying note 55.
122. United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
123. See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Justice Antitrust Guide Concerning Joint Ventures [July-Dec.]
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 992 (Special Supp.), at 6 (Dec. 4, 1980); U.S. Dept. of
Justice Antitrust Guide for International Operations, reprinted in [Jan*.-June] Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA) No. 799, at E-I (Feb. 1, 1977).
124. NCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 4301(b)(2).
125. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1988).
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the Sherman Act. However, it complicates matters in the patent
licensing area to the degree it implies distrust of field of use restraints.
Thefifth exclusion qualifiedly looks to production data exchanges of the
sort in American Column. 126 The sixth, also qualified, looks primarily
to mutually arranged production quotas. This qualification somewhat
undoes the offensive per se categorization of production quotas in that
there is an obvious if unintended invitation to use the venture's
production capacity as the venturers' balancer to avoid overwhelming
markets. Unqualified discouragement of the use of pre-existing facilities
for "new" products or technologies is the seventh, while the eighth is a
qualified catch-all to avoid embarrassment by non-germane restrictions.
Although the NCRA § 2(b) qualifications can vary, there are
common themes. Not all of the excluded activities are necessarily
characterized as illegal by another statutory scheme. Yet, the breadth of
the exclusions is such that particular manifestations of comprehended
conduct frequently would place combining actors in at least the occasion
of violating § 1 of the Sherman Act or other statutory norms. Each
qualification operates to permit the undoing of the exclusion it modifies
when doing so is germane to serving one or more of the acceptable
purposes delineated at NCRA § 2(a)(6). Accordingly, there are repeated
potencies for remitting venturers' otherwise suspicious conduct to the
NCRA "rule of reason standard."
Availability of the qualifications suggests a judicial procedure
somewhat analogous to those involved in establishing the "cost
justification" and "meeting competition" defenses to price discriminations
otherwise prohibited by § 2(a) of the Clayton Act" or to claiming
exemptions from the general prohibitions of the Securities Act of 1933.
Those who would claim the benefit of the NCRPA § 2(b) qualifications
inevitably will have the burden of proof."2  While the "Robinson-
Patman" defenses are absolute (even though the shielded discrimination
is injurious to competition), the qualifications to the NCRA § 2(b)
exclusions are not absolute. All they do is entitle comprehended conduct
to the relative safety of NCRPA sheltered but not altogether safe harbors.
Conduct permitted by a qualification, along with all other indulgences
allowed to a venture defined at NCRPA § 2(a)(6), is nonetheless exposed
to prosecution by reference to the NCRA "rule of reason standard." 29
126. American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
127. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a), (b).
128. See, e.g., United States v. Borden Co., 370 U.S. 460 (1962) (cost justification); Standard
Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951) (meeting competition).
129. "Section 2(b) excludes classic cartel-like behavior by participants in a joint R&D venture
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Do the qualifications present potencies for undoing per se doctrines
in terms of conduct indulged on behalf of defined ventures? Response
demands detailed consideration of NCRPA § 2(b).
b. Competitors' Data Exchanges. -Thus, the text of NCRPA
§ 2(b)(1) excludes "(1) exchanging information among competitors
relating to costs, sales, profitability, prices, marketing, or distribution of
any product, process, or service if such information is not reasonably
required to carry out the purpose of such venture"'10 from activities
permitted a "joint research and development venture" otherwise within
NCRPA § 2(a)(6). The basic exclusion seems unconcerned about data
exchanges among venturers who are not literal competitors even though
they are potential competitors. This is curious given the government's
concerns in other contexts with folks perceived at the edge of a market.
In any event, the qualified exclusion demands attention to not only
precedent but also DOJ policies concerning data exchanges among actual
competitors.
United States v. Container Corporation of America 3' dealt with
competitors' sporadic exchanges of price data without an agreement to
adhere to any pricing mode. Defendants accounted for approximately
90% of corrugated containers marketed from plants in the southeastern
United States. The price exchange was found "to stabilize prices though
at a downward level."32 Justice Douglas wrote for four of a majority
of five. He opined that "[t] he continuation of some price competition is
not fatal to the Government's case. The limitation or'reduction of price
competition brings the case within the ban, for as . ..held in...
Socony-Vacuum . . ., interference with the setting of price by free
market forces is unlawful per se."' a3 Vital context includes the fact
that Justice Fortas, supplying the fifth vote necessary to reinstate a
complaint dismissed by a trial judge, concurred in the judgment on the
specific understanding that the majority opinion did not hold that
competitors' exchanges of price data were offensive per se. However,
Justice Fortas opted for a half-way house that such exchanges,
accompanied by proof of substantial dampening of price competition,
definitively made out a rule of reason case in consequence of which there
from coverage under the Act." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1044, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3132.
130. NCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 4301(b)(1).
131. United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
132. Id. at 337.
133. Id. at 338.
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was "no need to consider the possibility of a per se violation. " '34
Writing for the dissenters, Justice Marshall nicely stated the need for a
full rule of reason inquiry.
35
Agreeing that competitors' naked agreements to effect price
stabilizations are and should be regarded as offensive per se to § 1 of the
Sherman Act, it is far from clear that competitors' mere exchanges of
data concerning actual costs and prices are inimical to free markets.
Does not perfect competition presuppose perfect knowledge? While it
would seem occasional data exchanges - without more - are no more
the occasion of violations than any other contact permitting competitors
to learn of one another's approaches to the marketplace, there is little
doubt that the DOJ regards competitors' exchanges of current pricing as
a bete noir of sorts.
In contexts other than NCRPA, DOJ personalities have expressed
great concern about price-sensitive data exchanges among persons
otherwise competitors in the context of their joinder as applicants for a
COR under ETCA Title III. The official form initially pertinent to
application for a COR contained a special "note" discouraging data
exchanges and suggesting that, if data were to be exchanged, they be
processed through an unrelated third party. 36  Presumably, the third
party would perform some sort of a sanitizing process. 13  DOJ
sensitivity translated this into clauses qualifying CORs, presumably
pursuant to ETCA § 303(b)(3), 38 to require minimization of data
exchanges. The effect of these clauses is not unlike NCRPA § 2(b)(1).
In any event, NCRA § 2(b) gives vitality to Justice Marshall's
dissent in Container Corporation and, per NCRPA § 3, data exchanges
among otherwise qualified joint venturers "reasonably required" for a
permitted NCRPA purpose have escaped Justice Fortas' willingness to
accept data exchanges followed by price stabilization as conclusively
violative of Sherman § 1. Pursuing an admittedly inexact analogy to
exemptions practice in venues such as federal regulation of new securities
issues,' 39 venturers who wish to take advantage of the qualification to
134. Id. at 339.
135. Id. at 340. Note that Justice Marshall was one of a majority later remitting a resale price
maintenance case to a rule of reason analysis when plaintiff, terminated in the wake of a competing
distributor's complaints about price-cutting, failed to prove that an agreement between the
complainant and the master marketer focused on resale pricing. See Business Electronics Corp. v.
Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
136. U.S. Dept. of Commerce Form ITA 4093P (5/83), D. Unkovic, J. Maher & N. LaMont,
International Opportunities & the Export Trading Company Act of 1982, B-2202 (1984).
137. See, e.g., Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
138. ETCA, 15 U.S.C. § 4013(b)(3).
139. The availability of a "securities" or "transaction" exemption is a defense to private suits
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NCRPA § 2(b)(1) must anticipate - by prudently preparing a "pro-
competitive" brief when forming a defined venture - ultimately having
to prove that anticipated data exchanges were "reasonably required" to
serve the Congressional-approved purposes set forth at NCRPA
§ 2(a)(6). 11 This does not suggest that NCRPA § 2(b)(1) frees
otherwise competing venturers to use NCRPA as a cover for collective
albeit indirect fixing of prices they individually charge or pay for goods
or services either beyond or comprehended by the venture.
c. Venturers' Restrictions Inter Se.-NCRPA § 2(b)(2) excludes
"entering into any agreement or engaging in any other conduct
restricting, requiring, or otherwise involving the marketing distribution
or provision by any person who is a party to such venture of any
product, process, or service, other than -" distribution among the
parties, pursuant to their permitted agreement, of "a product, process or
service produced" by the venture; marketing of proprietary data
developed by the venture per written agreements pre-dating NCPA; or
licensing or transferring intellectual property per leave of NCPA. So,
in effect, NCRPA is retroactive in at least one particular. Unlike
§§ 2(b)(1) and (3), the second qualified exclusion does not invoke a
reasonability standard. Whereas NCRA § 2(b)(1) reads on exchanges of
data among "competitors" and is unconcerned with such exchanges
among non-competitors, the basic exclusion in § 2(b)(2) looks to
restrictions inter se agreed upon by parties to a defined venture. By
definition, § 2(b)(2) does not exclude the imposition of restraints on third
parties and,. if such restraints serve licensing under § 2(a)(6) and survive
other exclusions, they are subjected to only the NCRA § 3 rule of reason
analysis!
Once one overcomes the inelegance of the § 2(b)(2) "exclusions,"
one finds that § 2(b)(2)(A) is a fairly forthright invitation to capitalize
upon the fruits of the joint venture by negotiating restrictions on
venturers' respective discretions to use or market products, processes,
and/or services produced by the venture. Similarly, §§ 2(b)(2)(B) and
(C) permit restrictions on how venture technology is marketed. In
NCRA, Congress neither explicitly afford safe-harbors for joint
procurement, production, and/or marketing ventures in and of themselves
under § 12(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §77(1) (1984).
140. Such homework should proceed with sensitivity to Congress' intent that the phrase
.reasonably required" imports an "objective standard and thus does not refer to the subjective
opinion of the participants, but rather to whether the particular circumstances at issue establish the
need to exchange the type of information in question and to do so in the planned manner." S. REP.
No. 427, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3113.
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nor condemned them. There was explicit recognition that such ventures
might have "significant procompetitive aspects."1 4' What do NCRPA
§ 2(a)(6) and the qualifications to § 2(b)(2) say when they are taken
together?
We are taught that statutory construction begins with the statute
itself. NCRPA § 2(a)(6) contemplates not only the production of goods
and services but research, reductions to practice, development and testing
"basic engineering techniques," prosecution of patent applications,
licensing of know-how and patents, and testing by or on behalf of a
defined venture.4 There is no limitation on licensees; they can be
parties or strangers to the venture. There is no reference to marketing
goods and services. Surely Congress could not have contemplated that
all fruits of the Venture would be consumed by venturers? What beyond
the "purposes" identified in § 2(a)(6) is implied by NCRA § 2(b)(2)?
NCRA § 2(b)(2) was focused on permitting marketing of proprietary
data. 43  NCRPA § 2(b)(2) is not so limited. The subsection
contemplates "distribution" among "parties" to the venture of non-
prorrietary products, processes, and services produced by the venture as
well as marketing technology jointly developed before NCRPA. This is
distinguished from agreements restricting commercial conduct re
"developments, products, processes or services" developed extrinsic to
the NCRPA venture.'" It is obvious that Congress' purpose included
blessing of inter-venturer restrictions on their respective uses of products
and services as well as the joint-control of marketing proprietary data
developed "through" the venture. Not so incidentally, parties to the
formation of a permitted venture are not disqualified from being its
licensees. Given the venture's ability to license parties as well as others,
it is inescapable that NCRPA permits the imposition of restrictions on
parties - even though they are competitors - in much the same way
non-parties can be restricted. In effect, Congress blessed parties'
allocations inter se of the exploitative values of venture developments,
products and services, ordaining that such allocations - if challenged -
be afforded the NCRPA rule of reason standard. Subsection 2(b)(2)(A)'s
permit for inter-venturer agreement concerning "distribution among the
parties" is an open sesame for limitations on uses including the
marketing by a venturer of a product or service provided by the venture.
141. Id. at 15-16, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3112-3113.
142. NCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 4301(b)(3).
143. Id. § 4301(a)(6)(E).
144. Id. § 4301(b)(3)(A).
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The subsection can have no other meaning. What, then, of NCRPA
§ 2(b)(4)?
These freedoms to impose certain restrictions raise a question as to
what else normally competing parties to a defined venture can accomplish
inter se, through agreements or "other conduct" mandating or "otherwise
involving" formulation or marketing of venture proprietary data, that
otherwise might present significant antitrust difficulties. NCRPA
§ 2(a)(6) permits collective licensing of proprietary data. There is
neither a mandate to license nor a limitation on the terms of licenses nor
a compulsion to license persons other than the venturers. On the face of
the matter, § 2(a)(6) exists to permit venturers' collective enjoyment of
the fruits of collective investment. Qualifications within NCRPA
§ 2(b)(2) exist to permit restraints inter se on venturers' marketing the
fruits of the venture. How does NCRPA § 2(b)(4) speak to a person
otherwise a competitor who is party to the venture? A per se prohibition
on any and all methods of "allocating a market" would undo not only
much of the earlier and later parts of § 2(b). What of venturers' field of
use licensing under U.S. patents? The Legislative history can be
discouraging! Explaining what would become NCRPA § 2(b)(4), 45
House Report No. 103-94 reported that it "excludes agreements and
conduct allocating any market with a competitor - for example a
geographic market, a product, process or service market; or a customer
market."1'I What are field-of-use restrictions if they are not market
allocations? A "rule of reason" unanticipated by the solons may be
necessary to avoid undoing Congress' ambition. Traditionally, courts
will endeavor to read statutes as internally consistent, particularly when
Congress essayed what it deemed a remedial course. An easy out is to
read "competitor" as a person in addition to those participating in the
venture. The stem of § 2(a) invites this but, the most obvious
significance would be to suggest a narrow reading of § 2(a) - the
"purpose" language, to prohibit, via §§ 2(b)(4), engagement in the direct
allocation of geographic territories and/or other fields of exploitation
other than as permitted by § 2(a)(6) as refined by §§ 2(b), (2), and (3).
Restated, NCRPA § 2 (b) (4) can be read as excluding conduct having no
purpose other than market allocation while provisions such as those
permitting technology licensing can be read to tolerate allocation as an
incident to indulging permitted activities.
145. Id. § 4301(b)(4).
146. H.R. REP. NO. 94, 103d Cong., Ist Sess., reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 176, 191
(emphasis added).
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Looking at § 2(a)(6) in isolation, licensing presumably can use
"field of use" and other restrictions common to the practice. Parties to
the venture are not disqualified as licensees. In effect, qualifications in
§§ 2(b)(2) and (3) confirm venturers' collective ability not only to
impose "field of use" and other usual restrictions on third party
licensees' enjoyment (including use or marketing) of venture data but to
divide particularized turf among the venturers. Such restrictions, of
course, are intrinsic to the patent monopoly, and NCRPA § 2(b)(2) can
be styled as looking to incentivize investment in anticipation of achieving
commercially valuable know-how and trade secrets as well as patents.
This, then, would serve § 2(b)(4)'s assault on marketing allocations to
read on agreements having an allocation as a principal purpose whereas
field of use restrictions can be regarded as merely incidental to
undoubtedly encouraged licensing.
d. Restraints imposed by NCRPA § 2(b)(3).-It is necessary to
consider usual Sherman Act interfaces with technology transfers in order
fully to assess the message of NCRPA. Before doing so, NCRPA
§ 2(b)(3) demands abbreviated consideration since it too deals with such
transfers. Section 2(b)(3) excludes parties to defined ventures from
entering into any agreement or engaging in any other conduct -
(A) to restrict or require the sale, licensing, or sharing of
inventions, developments, products, processes or services not
developed through, or produced by such venture, or
(B) to restrict or require participation by any person who is a
party to such venture in other research and development
activities,
that is not reasonably required to prevent misappropriation of
proprietary information contributed by any person who is a party to
such venture or of the results of such venture. 47
Here, we see the "reasonably required" standard used in a narrower
fashion than its use in NCRPA § 2(b)(1).' NCRPA § 2(b)(3)(A)
obviously relates to § 2(b)(4) and other traditional antitrust norms. The
point of the qualification to § 2(b)(3) is to permit venturers to stay within
the permissive definition at NCRPA § 2(a)(6), even though they
knowingly agree on restricting their freedom of action in specified areas
otherwise unrelated to the venture if their purpose is to protect against
147. NCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 4301(b)(3).
148. Id. § 4301(b)(1).
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misappropriation of proprietary data developed by the venture or
contributed to it by a party and if, very importantly, the ancillary
restraints are "reasonably related" to the overriding purpose. Species of
conduct external to a defined venture that can be restrained via § 2(b)(3)
are not only transfers of technology developed outside the venture and
participations in R & D independent of the defined venture but,
curiously, sales of "products, processes ... [and] .. .services not...
produced" by the venture. The qualification, in so far as it relates to
licensing technology necessarily including trade secrets, seems entirely
sensible in that it does little more than perpetuate a common law
disposition to relax the ordinary prejudice against a particularized
undertaking of restraints to the degree appropriate to protecting the
benefit of an otherwise legitimate bargain. However, it is not so easy to
rationalize a relaxation of restrictions on the sale of products produced
extrinsic to the venture.
3. Quick Look at Patents & Know-How
a. Without Reference to NCRPA. -A quick look at patents and
know-how in the antitrust crucible is appropriate before looking further
to NCRPA § 2(b). Implicit in a patentee's absolute power to exclude
others from making, using, or selling49 is the power selectively to
allow another or others to practice under one or more of the claims
allowed by the patent. Power to license is power to permit others to
practice only some of the claims allowed by the patent and otherwise to
limit licensees' practice within the patent monopoly. A patent holder can
be barred from enforcing it against alleged infringers if the holder is
provably using the patent to restrain conduct beyond the ambit of the
monopoly conferred by the patent. 50 Conduct may be characterized
as patent misuse even though it does not come to violate antitrust
laws. 5' The misuse defense is available even to infringers not directly
affected by the proven misuse. Misuse may be equivalent to an antitrust
violation and may confer standing for an affirmative claim.'52 Thus,
tying unpatented items to sales of patented machinery is offensive per se
to the Sherman Act if a "not insubstantial" amount of commerce is
149. 35 U.S.C. §§ 261, 271 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
150. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppinger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492-94 (1942).
151. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 140-41 (1969). See
criticism of misuse doctrine in Address by C. Rule, Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust
at The John Marshall Law School, 14-20 (on file with publisher).
152. See Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
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involved.'53 Ordinarily, in terms of Sherman § 1, licensing by holders
who unilaterally determine how patent pies are to be sliced is subject
only to rule of reason analyses. Considerable antitrust implications are
evoked by doing multilaterally what a patent holder can do unilaterally.
Thus, the fact that a product or process is patented does not bless the
holder's combination with competitors in order collectively to fix
royalties or to allocate markets, or both, although the holder unilaterally
may be able licitly to impose not only such restraints on licensees but to
restrict the prices at which they sell patented products.
Since a holder is free to license on a territorially restricted basis
within the United States, it is permissible for a holder to refuse to license
save on its unilaterally determined terms that effectively allocate
geographic markets within the United States." The same is true of
product markets unilaterally allocated through technological "field of
use" restrictions. 5 Successful attack, under § 1 of the Sherman Act,
on such allocations requires proof of agreement to allocate either by the
holder with its actual (or potential) competitors or among the licensees
with the holder serving as their conduit. Further, both G.E.
doctrines 56 survive for which reason a patent holder (a) can negotiate
with a manufacturing licensee to the effect that the holder will dictate the
price of the licensee's own sale of a product covered by the patent'57
and (b) can organize a distribution scheme whereby the holder dictates
prices to be exacted by true agents for the purpose of sale (including
agents who receive product on consignments). 58
The G.E. decision's leave for a patent holder to set its licensees'
prices is narrowly construed' 59 and a master marketer's decision to
market patented or unpatented goods via stocking agents is one that must
respect various antitrust ground rules."
153. See International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
154. Ethyl Gas Co. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 456 (1940).
155. Benger Labs., Ltd. v. R.K. Laros Col, 209 F. Supp. 639 (E.D. Pa. 1962), aff'd per
curiam, 317 F.2d 455 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 988 (1975).
156. See United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
157. Id. at 489-90.
158. Id. at 488. Uses of the consignment device are far from peculiar to the G.E. distribution
model. See, e.g., Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 21 (1964) (dicta); Mesirow v.
Pepperidge Farms, Inc., 703 F.2d 339, 341-43 (9th Cir. 1983); Harwick v. Nu-Way Oil Co., 589
F.2d 806, 808-11 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 836 (1979).
159. United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 299-304 (1948); Cummer-Graham Co.
v. Straight Side Basket Corp., 142 F.2d 646, 647 (5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 726
(1944).
160. Greene v. General Foods Corp., 517 F.2d 635, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 942 (1976); Roberts v. Exxon Corp., 427 F. Supp. 389, 391 (W.D. La. 1977).
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Since G.E. relied on the existence of a patent to warrant a federally-
conferred monopoly being the basis for a price-restrictive license, desires
for protection entertained by proprietors of production know-how (and
lesser proprietary data such as knowledge of customers' peculiarities) are
not so well protected. Equitable and legal remedies normally available
to proprietors of trade secrets are 'for the purpose of avoiding, or
affording damages for, tortious invasions of proprietary rights. There is
no legal guaranty against the successful reverse engineering of a trade
secret. Even if a trade secret or know-how has been resistant to reverse
engineering or another legitimate method of impeaching its proprietary
value, it always is subject to a licit second discoverer. Patentees' rights,
protected for a defined number of years as society's reward for the
inventor's disclosures in the application process, are not subject to
destruction by another's independent discovery or reverse engineering.
Proprietors of trade secrets maximize value by non-disclosure. Inherent
in this is a potency for protection well beyond the limited life of a patent.
There is no obvious analogy between the absolute legal monopoly for a
term of years enjoyed by the patentee and the defacto monopoly of the
trade secret, which may last forever or dissolve tomorrow. Indeed, the
predicates for patent and trade secret protections are philosophically
contrary. The patent system's predicate of inducing disclosure is aimed
at discouraging maintenance of trade secrets.
Price restrictions in know-how licenses are not justifiable on the
thesis that sustained the G.E. price restriction holding. On the other
hand, restraints against a know-how licensee's further revelation of data
are entitled to rule of reason analyses because they are qualified grants
of property as are field of use and geographic restrictions. However,
those licensing know-how must be alert to attitudinal problems such as
that nicely summed in A. & E. Plastik Pac. Co. v. Monsanto Co. in
which the Ninth Circuit said, "The critical question in an antitrust
context is whether the restriction may fairly be said to be ancillary to a
commercially supportable licensing arrangement, or whether the licensing
scheme is a sham set up for. . . controlling competition while avoiding
the consequences of the antitrust laws."61 They also should recall that
the classic characterization of resale price maintenance as offensive per
se to § 1 of the Sherman Act came out of a context in which the
proprietor of a trade secret sought to enforce a resale price maintenance
agreement against one who knowingly interfered with it." This
161. A. & E. Plastik Pac. Co. v. Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d 710, 715 (9th Cir. 1968).
162. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
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contrasts sharply with the protection afforded a price-restricted license,
under a licit patent, against knowing infringement. 63
With this background, it is useful to consider various precedents
concerning technology transfer. Price restraints saved by G.E. from per
se condemnation have been remarked. It is useful to state what G.E.
does not protect. G.E. does not permit the patent holder to fix prices of
unpatented products of patented processes or machines.' 14  G.E. does
not permit fixing resale prices."s Neither does it permit the holder to
be a participant in a concert of holders or licensees, or both, to fix
prices.' 66
The Supreme Court, in Line Material,67 refused to extend G.E. 's
teaching concerning a patent holder's unilateral imposition of a price-fix
on a manufacturing licensee to a situation involving price-restrictive
sublicensing by cross-licensees individually holding patents for an
electrical device and an improvement thereon. The improvement patent
could not be practiced without infringing on the device patent. While
cross-licenses were royalty-free to the respective holders, they granted
the improvement patent holder exclusive rights to sub-license third
parties on a price-restrictive basis, which restrictions the device patent
holder agreed to respect. This joinder, "to maintain prices on their
several products," was held to be "unlawful per se."11
Patentees' unilateral impositions of output ceilings on licensees are
subject only to rule of reason analyses69 but being a party to or a
conduit for multilateral adoption of quotas is not shielded by patents..
b. Effects of NCRPA.-Tying has been characterized a per se
offense if the seller uses a patent position to compel the purchase of other
patented or unpatented goods or services as a condition of access to a
patent monopoly. Yet, it seems inescapable that a qualified NCRA
venture's ties via a license from the venture was accorded the NCRA
rule of reason, and NCPA has not changed things. The DOJ's long
163. General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co., 304 U.S. 175, aff'd on reh 'g, 305
U.S. 124 (1938).
164. Cummer-Graham Co. v. Straight Side Basket Corp., 142 F.2d 646, 647 (5th Cir. 1944),
cert. denied, 323 U.S. 726 (1944).
165. Ethyl Gas Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940); United States v. Inivis Lens Co.,
316 U.S. 241 (1942).
166. United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 293-97, 305-15.
169. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41, 226 (D. Del. 1953),
aff'd on other grounds, 351 U.S. 357 (1956); Q-Tips, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 109 F. Supp. 657
(D.N.J. 1951), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 935 (1954), modified 207 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1993).
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antiquated 1980 Antitrust Guide Concerning Research Joint Ventures7°
was oriented to minimizing "fears, possibly unwarranted, of exposure to
antitrust attack."' In the Introduction to the Guide, the DOJ
remarked that
it is useful to distinguish between three different kinds of effects on
competition. The first is the effect that the essential elements of the
joint research project would have in lessening existing and potential
competition between the participating firms. If the joint activity has
some probably and significant (non de minimis) anticompetitive
effect, the question becomes whether the venture is, on balance, pro-
competitive, taking into account all aspects economically and
technically necessary for its success. Second, the project agreement,
or other related agreements between the participants, may contain
specific restrictions that restrain competition. If these restrictions are
not unreasonably ancillary to the essential elements of the project or
are of undue scope or duration, they, too, will present major antitrust
concerns. Finally, limitations on access to participation in joint
research or to the fruits of that research may present antitrust
problems if the effect of those limitations is to create or abuse market
power in the hands of the joint venturers. Each of the three kinds of
effects will be considered in turn. 17
Addressing "collateral restraints (non-patent)," the DOJ conceded
that their "legality . . .is largely a function of the proximity of their
relationship to the essential purposes of the joint research venture, as
well as their not having excessive scope or duration."17 The Guide's
examples of usually tolerated "closely related collateral restraints"
included "the obligation to exchange any results from research
undertaken previously in the field of the joint research, the duty not to
disclose results of the joint research to outside parties until patents are
obtained, and the division of particular aspects of the research between
the venturers." 7 4
To some degree, NCRPA § 2(a)(6) and §§ 2(b)(2) and (3) 175 are
authoritative restatements of the Guide's position but NCRPA goes much
further as it brings products and services into the mix. The. Guide
170. U.S. Dept. of Justice Antitrust Guide Concerning Research Joint Ventures, reprinted in
[July-Dec.] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 992 (Special Supp.) (Dec. 4, 1980) [hereinafter
Research Joint Ventures].
171. Id. at 2.
172. Id. at 3.
173. Id. at 5.
174. Id. NCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(6).
175. NCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 4301(b)(2), (3).
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recognized that various restraints are "generally reasonably necessary"
for conducting joint research and ordinarily would not have a "significant
anticompetitive impact."176 Agreements to collaborate at a level more
remote from "mere research efforts, resulting in projects which closely
approximate joint manufacturing ventures or even mergers" were
frowned upon.7 If such agreements were "reasonably necessary,"
however, limitation "to the results of the joint research," without
encompassing "other competing products or services marketed by the
cooperating firms," was approved "unless these other joint activities can
be justified on their own by a separate joint venture analysis."
1 78
A stronger line was taken toward any agreement "collateral to
research undertaken by competing firms that divides the market as to
customers served or fixes prices charged for products and services of the
venturers," which was styled "as a per se violation of the antitrust
laws." 79  Among cited authorities"8 was Timken Roller Bearing Co.
v. United States. 8' The decree entered in that case was terminated in
1983.182
At this point, it is appiopriate to remark an important portion of
NCRA's legislative history:
The joint granting of licenses or the refusal to grant licenses by
participants in a joint R & D program is within the scope of the
Act - as are restrictions on such licenses reasonably required to
prevent misappropriation of proprietary information contributed by
any participant or of the results of the program .... Joint ventures
in production and marketing are not, of course, necessarily
anticompetitive; indeed, they may have significant procompetitive
aspects. But this legislation is not directed to these joint ventures.
However, the sale or licensing of patents, know-how, or other
proprietary information that are developed through a joint R & D
program may constitute part of the program. Obviously, marketing
this intellectual property may be the ultimate goal and a key financial
aspect of a joint R & D program and is rightfully viewed as an
integral part of it .. . . As used [in qualifications to what became
the NCRA § 2(b) exceptions] the term "reasonably required" denotes
an objective standard and thus does not refer to the subjective opinion
176. Research Joint Ventures. supra note 170, at 5.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 5-6.
179. Id. at 6.
180. Id. at 6 n.1.
181. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951).
182. U.S. Dept. of Justice Press Release (May 20, 1983) (on file with publisher).
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of the participants, but rather to whether the particular circumstances
at issue establish the need to exchange the type of information in
question and to do so in the planned manner. For example, under
this standard any exchange of information that results in an agreement
or that represents concerted action toward an agreement to fix prices
for goods or services would never be reasonably required by a joint
R & D program .... Few firms will make significant contributions
to joint R & D programs if they cannot be assured that monetary
support or technical know-how that they contribute to the program
will not be appropriated by others and used outside the joint program
against them. For example, one participant in a joint R & D venture
might convert what is essentially the product of the joint R & D
program to his own exclusive use. Accordingly, the exclusion [to
what became NCRA § 2(b)(3)] makes proper allowance for covenants
in joint R & D programs that are reasonably required to protect the
participants' investments.83
These words addressed a precursor to NCRA § 2(b) but the ultimate
conference committee explicitly adopted them. '
NCRPA § 2(a)(6) obviously contemplates that the activities of a
defined joint venture, which acquires or achieves patent and other
proprietary positions, can include licensing not only third parties but also
the ventures themselves. NCRPA § 2(b)(2)(A) reinforces this. Doesn't
the venture assume such a personality per NCRPA § 2(a)(6) that the
venture individually or, if the venturers have chosen to dispense with
centralized management of a joint venture vehicle, the venturers
collectively can take advantage of the G.E. holding concerning hitherto
unilaterally designed price-restricted licenses? Wasn't Line Material
undone as conduct permitted by the venture defined at NCRPA § 2(a)(6),
buttressed by § 2(b)(2)(A), is relegated to the NCRPA rule of reason?
That Congress could have ordained otherwise is testified to by the
disfavor accorded bald allocations by NCRPA § 2(b)(4)."'
Returning to the DOJ Guide as it relates to "collateral restraints
(patent and know-how)," there was recognition that cross-licensing of
patents and exchange of know-how may be
particularly necessary, for instance, when a 'blocking' patent that
would prevent research or development is held by one of the
partners. It is not unreasonable under such circumstances to limit the
183. S. REP. No. 427, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-17, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 3112-3113
(emphasis added).
184. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1044, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 3132.
185. NCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 4301(b)(4).
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use of the contributed patents to that field at which the research is
directed if it is a clearly separate field of use.'"
This is consistent with the spirit of the much later NCRPA. The Guide
went further, on an explicit level, by acknowledging that it is "normally
permissible for the partners to agree to exchange all technical information
directly relevant to the success of the project gained by their independent
research efforts during the pendency of the venture."' But, the Guide
also observed that agreements "in licenses between the venturers such as
ones obligating them not to undercut each other's prices or not to solicit
each other's customers are per se antitrust violations."a This was in
accord with respected authorities."8 But, if a joint venture defined at
NCRA § 2(a)(6) can impose price restrictions on licensees and the
venturers themselves are permissible licensees, it seems that Line
Material is undone in the limited context of NCRPA joint venturers.
Since NCRPA § 2(a)(6) contemplates that venturers may establish
"facilities for . . .prosecuting .. . applications for patents and the
granting of licenses for the results of such venture[s]," it seems that joint
NCRPA venture vehicles so endowed with licensing power have been
equated with monoliths such as the licensor in G.E. to the effect that
such vehicles can negotiate price-restrictive licenses under their own
proprietary positions and, through sensibly-defined use restrictions and
geographic allocations, can effectively minimize competition among the
venturers and others to the degree enjoyment of the fruits of NCRA-
blessed "cooperative research" are concerned with the entire confidence
that judicial testing will be under the NCRPA "rule of reason standard."
4. Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. -There is little point to
developing considerable background concerning § 2 of the Sherman
Act." It has not occasioned the generation of per se theories. Since
it is conceivable that activities of a joint venture defined at NCRPA
§ 2(a)(6) could become subject to attack as monopolization, it is
appropriate to note the effect of the NCRPA "rule of reason standard"
upon prosecutors of monopolization theories.
Thus, the "presumptive illegality" supposedly implicit in
deliberately amassing or defending a 70% share of an appropriately
186. See supra Research Joint Ventures, note 170, at 6.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948); Hartford-Empire Co. v. United
States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945).
190. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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defined market has gone by the boards in the case of a venture within the
definition at NCRPA § 2(a)(6). NCRPA-defined ventures are not to-be
judged by the possession of monopoly power alone for which reason
United States v. Krasnow..' and United States v. National Lead
Co." are not immediately pertinent to NCRPA § 3 prosecutions. The
same can be said about Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.
as it addressed exclusive and effectively restraining patent pools in the
absence of classic monopoly power. 193
On the other hand, looking to the "specific intent" element in
attempts to monopolize,"9 it would not appear that prosecutors of an
attempt theory against NCRPA-defined ventures would be newly
burdened. Just as the classic rule of reason enunciated in Chicago Board
did not operate to shield defendants possessed of anticompetitive
ambitions, it seems that NCRPA § 3 has not changed that ground-rule.
C. Clayton Antitrust Act Implications
The Clayton Antitrust Act both amended and supplemented the
Sherman Act. Enacted shortly after FTCA, the Clayton Act ordained
substantive rules of decision as well as providing civil remedies for the
violation of substantive rules embodied in the Sherman Act and other
statutes including the Clayton Act. Principal substantive thrusts of
Clayton were directed at particularized species of commercial conduct to
the degree they presented a probability of injury to competition, although
some proscriptions introduced well after 1914 are applicable without
proof of such a probability. Of the Clayton Act's substantive rules, this
part of the Article treats only of §§ 2 (certain commercial discriminations
and kick-backs), 3 (certain seller or lessor imposed restraints on
"customer" conduct), and 7 (certain acquisitions). Section 2 has sub-
parts that are unconcerned with proof of even the probability of injury
to competition.
In qualitative terms, NCRA's principal impact on Clayton Act
norms relates to its § 7. 91 Popularly mischaracterized as an anti-
merger statute, § 7 looks to acquisitions of not only enterprises and
interests in enterprises but also, more starkly, assets. Not unduly limited
191. United States v. Krasnow, 143 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Pa. 1956), aff'dper curiam, 335 U.S.
5 (1957).
192. United States v. Nat'l Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513, 531-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), aff'd 332 U.S.
319 (1947).
193. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 114 n.8 (1969).
194. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905).
195. 15 U.S.C. § 18.
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by techniques of acquisition, the statute can be applied to joint ventures
just as it can be applied to asset acquisitions and mergers. While one
might have inferred that NCRA's impact on Clayton § 7 was purposeful
and (given the legislative purpose of NCRA) sensible, such inferences
concerning Clayton §§ 2 and 7 were more difficult. The situation is the
same in the wake of NCPA.
1. Section 7 of the Clayton Act & Related Applications of Section
1 of the Sherman Act.-Reference to the DOJ Research Joint Venture
Guide provides a basis for shifting to preliminary consideration of
structuring joint ventures within NCRPA § 2(a)(6). Although it is crystal
clear that § 7 of the Clayton Act embraces joint ventures implemented by
erection of incorporated or limited partnership or Massachusetts trust
vehicles in which venturers receive equity participations in exchange for
their investments or pledges of investment, appropriateness of the niceties
of § 7 analyses to joint ventures analogous to general partnerships is far
from settled. The Guide noted that a "joint research project that is
purely contractual and involves no acquisition of any asset does not come
within the scope of section 7 but would be subject to Section 1 of the
Sherman Act."" This, of course, was a truism of sorts. Ignoring,
for the moment, the fact that NCRA § 2(a)(6) almost cries out for
implementation by the creation of an incorporated vehicle that, in its
turn, can become a party to the master joint venture agreement, it is
clear that - whether or not Clayton § 7 addresses general
partnerships - NCRPA permits them to be qualified joint ventures.
What is more remarkable about the interface of § 7 and NCRA is
the fact that § 7 condemns comprehended acquisitions when "in any line
of commerce in any section of the country, the effects of such acquisition
may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly."' This "competitive injury" standard may be applicable
quite without reference to the acquirer's purposes although, if
demonstrably anticompetitive, they are relevant. Further, although this
"competitive injury" standard looks to probabilities, courts (including the
highest one) have seemed to be somewhat fearful of the burdens implicit
in qualitative analysis'" and quite willing to jump from statistics
demonstrating a lessening in the number of competitors or a trend toward
concentration of market power, to a conclusion phrased qualitatively.
196. Research Joint Ventures, supra note 170.
197. Id. at 3.
198. 15 U.S.C. § 18.
199. See, e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
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They did so in contexts of perceptions of accelerated trends to domestic
concentrations and a belief that a given Congress was in favor of a nation
of small entrepreneurs. 2" The effect of such decisional processes was
what amounted to a substitution of the possibility of injury to the
competitive process for the probability of such injury."° Although the
Supreme Court belatedly signaled a willingness for lower courts to
entertain qualitative defenses to contrived quantitative prima facie
cases' and modem versions of the so-called Merger Guidelines tend
to pay more respect to qualitative considerations than did the courts,
unfortunate judicial precedents have not been removed from the books
and the Guidelines are neither law nor even an estoppel on the
government.203
Application of the NCRPA "rule of reason standard" to all federal
antitrust laws is most significant. Those who would challenge either the
organization of a venture defined at NCRPA § 2(a)(6) or the later
investment in it by a new venturer would seem burdened quite beyond
the loose competitive injury precedents under § 7 of the Clayton Act.
While Chicago Board's rule of reason countenances consideration of
probabilities, it never was used to permit the substitution of mere
possibilities for probabilities nor did it foreclose close attention to
defendant's purposes. No less can be said of NCRPA § 3.
Ordinary applicability of § 7 of the Clayton Act to at least those
joint ventures employing an incorporated vehicle is a given. NCRPA § 3
explicitly embraces "antitrust laws" including § 7 of the Clayton Act.
It is the NCRPA "rule of reason standard," rather than § 7 of the
Clayton Act and Sherman Act acquisition-testing precedent, under which
will be gauged competitive implications of combinations of persons -
whether or not otherwise competitors - in joint ventures defined at
NCRPA § 2(a)(6).
What is the significance of this displacement of the Clayton Act's
§ 7? Literature concerning § 7, and philosophies said not only to
underlie it but to guide its application, is legion. There can be little
doubt that some successful prosecutions under § 7 were of dubious social
value. Although so-called Merger Guidelines issued during recent
administrations demonstrate greater respect for competition as a
200. Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States (Brown Shoe I), 370 U.S. 294, 312-23 (1962).
201. C. Brown Shoe I, 370 U.S. at 343 with United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S.
321 (1963).
202. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
203. Although it cannot be gainsaid that Guidelines may embarrass a plaintiff complaining of
an acquisition. See, e.g., Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 414 F.2d 506
(3d Cir. 1969).
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qualitative concept than is apparent in prior "leading" decisions,
unfortunate judicial precedent has not been erased by successive sets of
Guidelines. They do nothing save signal the line of thought pursued by
those currently entrusted with part of the federal enforcement power.
When one addresses the formation of a long-term combination, reliance
on the Guidelines is reliance on the circumspection of prosecutors' as
yet unappointed by regimes as yet unelected. Further, and often
overlooked, private suitors have not endorsed the Guidelines, which
purport only to guide enforcement decisions by public officers and
cannot change precedent.
While classic applications of § 7 have related to acquisitions in the
horizontal and vertical arrays, it also has been applied to so-called
conglomerate acquisitions.' Whether dealing with horizontal,
vertical, or conglomerate combinations, prosecutors under § 7 have no
need to show the anticompetitive purposes of those acquiring or
combining although, most assuredly, such purposes are relevant.
Congress' § 7 concern is for competition "in any line of commerce in
any part of the country." Hence, given the definition of a relevant
product or service market, there is significant potential for artificially
maximizing the combination's market share (and, therefore, its presumed
threat to competition) by narrowly defining geographic zones of
competition.'
Precedent under § 7 reveals little explicit judicial attention to the
quality of competition, particularly in connection with horizontal
integration. In the context of emphases on market share and other
quantitative data including trends toward concentration, it often was
made to appear that the true § 7 measures of the vitality of competition
were the numbers of competitors and relative market shares of those who
would survive the acquisition or other combination in question.. Thus,
if there is a concentration of effective competitors on a given level of the
exploitation-refinement-distribution chain, or even if there is a marked
trend toward such a condition, precedent indicates that the prosecution
need prove only a likelihood that the acquisition of an actual or potential
competitor will present a greater risk that surviving major participants
will have greater market power. Albeit unlabeled as such, such a
showing amounts to presumptive illegality.
Congress' generic purpose in enacting substantive provisions of the
Clayton Act is said to have been to address, in their incipiency,
204. But, see, United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 285 (1943) (food & dnig).
205. See, e.g., FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
206. See, e.g., United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966).
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arrangements that might mature into Sherman Act violations. Applying
§ 7 in government prosecutions, judicial concern for the likelihood of
injury to competition seems to look to "incipient incipiencies" other than
those reserved to the FTC' rather than to realistic probabilities.
Should the prosecution lack the ability to sell a perception of industrial
concentration or a trend to it, prosecutors must be prepared to develop
a probability of injury to the competitive process that is considerably
more certain than the likelihood of a risk of greater market power
becoming available to the acquirer. In the mid-seventies, the Supreme
Court indirectly evoked more judicial care by crediting a defensive
showing that the quality of competition was unprejudiced despite a
dramatically increased concentration in an arbitrarily defined product
market. 20'
While the DOJ's Merger Guidelines have become more sensitive to
the concept that quantitative data have meaning only in terms of
qualitative effect, practitioners cannot lose sight of the facts that the
Guidelines neither estop public prosecutors nor have a life necessarily
succeeding a given political administration. The latter consideration is
accentuated by precedent demonstrating that it is feasible to attack an
acquisition decades after the event.' Further, although the Guidelines
have potency to embarrass public prosecutors, they do not clearly present
such a value vis-a-vis private plaintiffs under § 7.
The NCRPA "rule of reason standard" has great significance in
terms of avoiding sloppy precedent elaborating § 7 of the Clayton Act as
well as refining addresses of §§ 1 and 2 to joint ventures comprehended
by NCRPA. While DOJ merger, joint research venture, and
international operations210 guides have been sympathetic to joint R&D,
they were neither law nor more than politically transitory. NCRPA § 3
is law. It ordains that ventures defined by NCRA § 2(a)(6) are to be
tested by the NCRPA "rule of reason standard." Those who object to
either the fact or the progress of a venture defined at NCRPA § 2(a)(6)
will be burdened to a degree significantly greater than prosecutors
ordinarily entitled to invoke the unvarnished precedent evolved under § 7
of the Clayton Act. Indeed it seems that the rigor of U.S. v. Columbia
207. JohnA. Maher, Two Little Words and FTC Goes Local, 80 DICK. L. REV. 193, 211 n.119
(1976) (referring to the effect of FTC v. Brown Shoe Co. (Brown Shoe II), 384 U.S. 316, 321-22
(1966)).
208. See supra note 202.
209. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
210. The Justice Department has announced that it and the FTC invite public comment
concerning a proposal to revise the 1988 DOJ Guidelines for international operations. U.S. Dep't
of Justice Press Release (Oct. 13, 1994).
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Steel Co. 211 is likely to provide guidance for analyses focused on the
formation of NCRPA joint ventures.
The NCRPA § 3 rule of reason standard implicitly includes
venturers' purposes among "relevant factors affecting competition" just
as surely as it includes all other "factors affecting competition"
extending, most significantly, to "effects on competition in properly
defined relevant research, development product, process and service
markets . . . [understood to embrace] . . . worldwide capacity."
212
Venturers' procompetitive purposes, and probable as well as actual
procompetitive effects of their venture, will be as susceptible of defensive
use as alleged anticompetitive purposes and potencies are of prosecutorial
significance. In this alone is a great difference from precedent under § 7
of the Clayton Act. The magnitude of the difference is accentuated when
one recognizes that attack on the fact of continued operation of an
NCRPA § 2(a)(6) venture must entail proof inter alia of actual
(presumably adverse) "effects on competition in . . . relevant research,
development, product, process and service markets." Thus, there is a
significant displacement of the numbers game played under § 7 of the
Clayton Act, particularly when one focuses on joint ventures by persons
otherwise competitors, and a Congressional reinvocation of qualitative
analyses of not only joint ventures but venture's acquisitions.
2. Section 2 of the Clayton Act.-Since § 2 of the Clayton Act is
concerned with price and other commercial discriminations, it is not
peculiar to joint ventures. However, there is a real potency for NCRPA
§ 3 to work presumably unanticipated magic on classic "Robinson-
Patman" themes.
Unlike §§ 32 and 7214 of the Clayton Act, its §§ 2(c),(d), and
(e) lack "competitive injury" standards. 5 Therefore, in effect, they
statutorily define per se offenses. But, if a venture defined by NCRPA
§ 2(a)(b) accommodates the marketing of a product by paying "phony
brokerage '' 216 or affording disproportionate merchandising supports to
competing customers,1 7 the NCRPA rule of reason is applicable.
211. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948) (Sherman Act).
212. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
213. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1988).
214. 15 U.S.C. § 18.
215. 15 U.S.C. § 13(c)-(e).
216. 15 U.S.C. § 13(c).
217. 15 U.S.C. § 13(d), (e).
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Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, the basic civil price discrimination
statute," 8 burdens sellers of commodities. The section has three
alternate. competitive injury standards of which none deals directly with
sellers' purposes. They are concerned with probabilities of injury to the
competitive process occurring at the level of the discriminating seller's
competitors ("primary level"), at the level of a disfavored customer itself
competing with a favored customer ("secondary level"), and at the level
of sub-customers ("tertiary level"). While § 2(a) prosecutions alleging
injury at the primary level tend to evoke evidence of a seller's
anticompetitive purpose as germane to the probability of injury,219
discrimination among competing customers tends to speak for itself.'
The NCRPA § 3 rule of reason, by definition, will burden public and
private prosecutions of NCRA-defined ventures under § 2(a) of the
Clayton Act. The same is true of prosecutions under § 2(f)22' of
NCRPA venturers as buyers who knowingly receive the benefit of
discriminations prohibited by § 2(a). NCRPA will not hamper criminal
prosecutions under § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act since it is defined as
an antitrust law in neither the Clayton Act nor NCRPA.
3. Section 3 of the Clayton Act & Sherman Act
"Tying. "--Assuming the requisite probability of injury to the competitive
process, § 3 condemns lessor or seller-imposed requirements contracting,
tying, exclusive dealing, and granting of price concessions to secure
benefitted customers' abstention from using or dealing in commodities of
the conceding marketer's competitors.'m
Like § 2 of the Clayton Act, § 3 is not peculiarly pertinent to joint
ventures. However, the NCRPA "rule of reason standard" presents
potential for circumscribing the application of § 3 of the Clayton Act to
marketing techniques used either by a venture defined at NCRPA
§ 2(a)(6) or, in certain circumstances, parties to such a venture. This
potential arises from not only NCRPA's "rule of reason standard" but
also encouragement, per NCRPA § 2(a)(6)(G), to the "granting of
218. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a). Note that the penal portion of the Robinson-Patman Act neither is part
of the Clayton Act nor otherwise constitutes one of the antitrust laws. 15 U.S.C. § 13a.
219. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC, 289 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1961).
220. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
221. 15 U.S.C. § 13(0.
222. 15 U.S.C. § 14. The purpose of § 3 is to minimize anticompetitive foreclosure of outlets
for commodities. Although money was held - long ago - not to constitute a commodity for
purposes of a § 3 tying analysis, United States v. Investors Diversified Serv. Co., 105 F. Supp. 645
(D. Minn. 1951), the Supreme Court later took pains to stress that money is a commodity in a
Sherman Act tying context when the stress was unnecessary. Former Enterprises, Inc. v. U.S. Steel
Corp. (Former I), 394 U.S. 495, 509 (1969).
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licenses for the results" produced by defined ventures linked to leave, set
forth at NCRPA § 2(b)(2), for venturers to indulge conduct "restricting,
requiring or otherwise involving ... marketing" so long as it is limited
to the enjoyment "of proprietary information developed through" the
venture or entails distribution inter se of fruits of the venture.
Potential for circumscribing § 3 of the Clayton Act via NCRPA § 3
is not as dramatic as the effect of the NCRPA "rule of reason standard"
on Sherman Act tying jurisprudence. Per se stigmatization of tying, of
course, is limited to § 1 of the Sherman Act. The stigmatization is
curious. Proceeding under § 3 of the Clayton Act, prosecutors
theoretically are required to demonstrate some fairly substantial
probability of anticompetitive effect.' This contrasts sharply with the
burden implicit in prosecuting per se offenses. Unlike Sherman Act
violations, violations of § 3 of the Clayton Act do not expose
transgressors to penal consequences. Alone among the commercial
practices addressed by § 3, tying has been stigmatized as also offensive
per se to the Sherman Act. However, unlike the classic per se offenses
but somewhat comparable to concerted refusals to deal, both purpose and
power are relevant to characterizing tying as offensive per se to § 1 of
the Sherman ActY 4 Unlike § 3 of the Clayton Act, which condemns
certain conduct of sellers and lessors of commodities for use or resale
within the United States,' the Sherman Act can be applied not only
against leveraging buyers, lessees, and licensees but also to transactions
in fields such as realty, services and intellectual property' without the
Clayton Act's limiting jurisdictional reference to use or consumption in
the United States. Dicta in Times-Picayane Publishing Co. v. United
States taught that
when the seller enjoys a monopolistic position in the market for the
'tying' product, or if a substantial volume ... in the 'tied' product
is restrained, a tying agreement violates the narrower standards
expressed in § 3 of the Clayton Act because from either factor the
requisite potential lessening of competition is inferred. And because
for even a lawful monopolist it is 'unreasonable' per se, to foreclose
competitors from any substantial market, . . . tying ... is banned by
§ 1 of the Sherman Act whenever both conditions are met.227
223. Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrave-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346 (1922).
224. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. Number 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
225. 15 U.S.C. § 14.
226. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (dominance of realty used to
tie patronage of rail carriage); United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962) (ties of
copyrighted cinema productions).
227. Times-Picayane Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 608-09 (1953).
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Writing § 3 of the Clayton Act, Congress burdened prosecutors with
proving that "the effect of such lease [or] sale .. .[of a commodity
subject to tying or other conditions] ...may be to substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce. "I'
The real point was to relieve prosecutors from heavier burdens then
demanded of prosecutions under § 1 of the Sherman Act as they might
be aimed at tying, exclusive dealing, or requirements contracting (then
thought of as tools suitable to would-be monopolists). Only commodity
marketers were exposed to § 3 of the Clayton Act. Section 3 liberated
prosecutors from necessarily offering proof of commodities marketers'
anticompetitive purposes or their arrangements' inevitably anticompetitive
effects. 9 Yet, Congress did not feel impelled to subject commodities
marketers' tying, exclusive dealing, and full requirements contracting to
per se prohibitions. By definition, § 3 does not read on either such
practices indulged by marketers of services of realty or impositions by
powerful customers.
In the 1958 Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States decision, the
Supreme Court not only held tying by a dominant merchant to be
offensive per se to § 1 of the Sherman Act but so ordained in a context
in which a dominant real estate operator tied its rail carriage services.
Writing for the majority, Justice Black repeated respected theorems that
"it is not material that the prices fixed or the markets allocated were
reasonable" and purported to relegate "business necessity" to
obloquy.23 Subsequently, mandatory block-booking of copyrighted
cinema productions was condemned as tying offensive per se to § 1 on
the dubious thesis that a copyright is the economic equivalent of a patent
in terms of being a licit monopoly itself constituting a dominant market
position.23 Thereafter, devolution of dominance over the tying item
of commerce proceeded from a "sufficient economic power to impose an
appreciable restraint on free competition in the tied product" to, in a case
involving promotion of prefabricated housing by the provision of below-
market development loans, "some advantage not shared by [the tying
merchant's] competitors in the market for the tying" item of
commerce." Thus, assuming that a "not inconsiderable amount of
commerce" in the tied item of commerce was foreclosed from the tying
228. 15 U.S.C. § 14.
229. 15 U.S.C. § 14. See also Standard Fashion Co. v. Margrave-Hudson, 258 U.S. 346
(1922).
230. Northern Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 5.
231. Loew's, 371 U.S. at 38.
232. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. (Former II), 429 U.S. 610, 620 (1977).
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marketer's competitors, 233 prosecution of tying under § 1 of the
Sherman Act became almost as easy as prosecution of commodity ties
under § 3 of the Clayton Act. In 1984 the Supreme Court somewhat
retreated from the devolution by indicating that a successful Sherman Act
prosecution must include proof of a coercive effect on the customer
subjected to the tie, 4  Such coercion is not necessarily part of the
prosecutor's burden under § 3 of the Clayton Act.
It is conceivable that a joint venture defined at NCRPA § 2(a)(6)
may make its product, service, process or licenses of its technology
available only on the condition that the buyer, lessee, and/or licensee
accept a tie geared to not only the venture's enjoyment of the fruits of its
Congressionally-encouraged technological advance but also to quality
control (achievable, e.g., by the use of a proprietary catalyst). Whether
or not one or more of these business reasons is pertinent, the NCRPA
"rule of reason standard" will supplant not only the threat of a per se
application, of the Sherman Act but also the probable injury test of
Clayton § 3.
D. Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) Implications
Irony truly attends consideration of NCRPA's impact (and the lack
thereof) on FTCA. As enacted in 1914, FTCA's principal thrust was
directed at "unfair methods of competition."" NCRPA's definition
of "antitrust laws" explicitly contemplates exactly that thrust of FTCA.
However, the Wheeler-Lea amendments of 1938 engrafted "unfair or
deceptive acts or practices" onto FTCA § 5's address to "unfair methods
of competition." 26 By definition, NCRPA does not include FTCA's
concern with "unfair . . . acts or practices" among "antitrust laws"
conditionally subordinated to NCRA's rule of reason. The legislative
histories of NCRA and NCPA fail to explain the rationales for
distinguishing between FTCA's disjunctive addresses to "unfair methods
of competition" and "unfair ... acts or practices."
That FTC jurisdiction to condemn "unfair. . . acts or practices" is
significant to virtually all exclusionary commercial undertakings cannot
be gainsaid since the Supreme Court's 1966 Brown Shoe II and 1972
S&H decisions. The former authorized the FTC to condemn conflict
233. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392(1947); see also FortnerI, supra note
222.
234. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. Number 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
235. 15 U.S.C. §§ 43-45.
236. 15 U.S.C. §§41,44-45. See generally D. Unkovic, et al., supra note 11, atA-31 toA-
34.
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with "the basic principles of the Sherman and Clayton Acts even though
such practices may not actually violate" such statutes.3 7  S&H went
further, holding that the FTC's prosecutorial and judicial roles are
triggered by public values beyond simply those enshrined in the letter or
in the spirit of the antitrust laws.3" Violations of FTC § 5(a)(1) do not
expose alleged transgressors to private suitors. Prosecutions for
engagement in "unfair methods of competition" entail proof of "at least
a tendency to injure respondent's competitors."" One of the purposes
of the Wheeler-Lea amendment to FTCA § 5(a)(1) was to remove this
need for evidence of the potential for injury to competitors of the
respondent.'u Brown Shoe II and S&H speak to judicial respect for
this purpose. The decisions defer to FTC expertise and demand nothing
remotely reminiscent of a rule of reason analysis.
Although NCRA's legislative history is less than helpful to
understanding why Congress chose to permit FTC to exert its
"unfair... acts or practices" jurisdiction over not only joint ventures
defined by NCRPA but also their activities, a key may be provided by
the legislative history for ETCA. Its legislative history betrays
misconceptions that only FTC's "consumer protection" jurisdiction is
summed up by "unfair deceptive acts or practices" whereas the
Commission's antitrust jurisdiction is implicit in "unfair methods ofcompetition."4' Long before the Wheeler-Lea amendments, consumer
protection played a significant role in the elaboration of "unfair methods
of competition."2 The Wheeler-Lea amendments to FTCA § 5(a)(1)
did not spring solely from a need to add consumer protection to antitrust.
S&H and Brown Shoe II were not "consumer protection" cases.
Nonetheless, the amendment of FTCA § 5(a) by ETCA Title IV
burdened only the prosecution of "unfair methods of competition"
cases,243 and the COR shield made available under ETCA Title III is
ineffective against FTC attacks on "unfair . . . acts or practices." 2'
A conceptual error implicit in ETCA has been brought forward - sub
silentio - into NCRPA's definition of the "antitrust laws." This
237. See Brown Shoe 1I, supra note 207, at 321-22.
238. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972).
239. FTC v. Raladam Co. (Raladam I), 283 U.S. 643, 647-49 (1931).
240. 80 CONG. REC. 6588 (1936). Note that, when conditionally providing for exemption of
joint R&D by small businesses from antitrust laws and FTCA § 5(a)(1), Congress did not see fit to
discriminate between "unfair methods of competition" and "unfair or deceptive acts or practices."
15 U.S.C. § 638(d)(3) (1988).
241. H.R. REP. No. 686, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2493.
242. See Raladam 1, supra note 239.
243. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(3).
244. ETCA, 15 U.S.C. § 4012(6).
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NCRPA anomaly is not confined to FTC jurisdiction but, as developed
later, also impacts at the state level.
FTC jurisdiction over "unfair . . . acts and practices" has eluded
NCRPA's net. Thus, the NCRPA rule of reason will not burden the
FTC (if the political context changes sufficiently to encourage
Commission prosecutions under or elaborating Brown Shoe II and S&H).
The author submits that this is unfortunate as it may come to cause
NCRPA venturers to think the FTC is inevitably burdened by the
NCRPA "rule of reason standard." Failure to immunize ventures
defined at NCRPA § 2(a)(6) from FTC "unfair . . . acts or practices"
jurisdiction presents, of course, a trap for those who ignore the
likelihood that a now politically-constrained FTC is only a sleeping giant
in terms of not only prosecutorial but rule-making potencies.45
E. State Implications
While many federal antitrust statutes and much of the FTC's
jurisdiction reach conduct only affecting interstate or foreign commerce,
there is not a generalized preemption of state ability to adopt and enforce
antitrust, unfair trade, and comparable statutes. States' police powers
include the ability to regulate intrastate commerce. The Supreme Court
respects state antitrust jurisdiction over local manifestations of interstate
commerce. 246
Many states have antitrust statutes resonating basic themes of the
Sherman Act. Many states, without necessary reference to whether they
have antitrust laws, have unfair trade practice statutes (a/k/a "little FTC
Acts") which tend to be far more particularized than FTCA § 5(a)(1).
Several states have "unfair sales acts" or similar statutes dealing with
price discrimination or sales below cost. 7
It is impractical herein to remark on state statutes and precedents at
length. Various states seek to encourage private enforcement by the
provision of treble damages. Earlier, it was noted that state competition
laws have not been subjected to general preemption. ETCA, NCRA and
NCPA, present species of particularized preemption. Title III of ETCA
contemplates that conduct described in a COR is shielded against public
or private enforcement of "any state antitrust or unfair competition
245. The FTC has authority to promulgate "trade regulation rules" by reference to its
jurisdiction over "unfair ... acts or practices." 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1)(B) (1988).
246. Standard Oil of Ky. v. Tenn., 217 U.S. 413, 422 (1910).
247. See R. Feilmoth & T. Papageorge, A Treatise on State Antitrust Law and Enforcement,
[July-Dec.] 892 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) Supp. No. 1, at 20 (Dec. 7, 1978).
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law."' NCRA and NCPA present another species of particularized
preemption but their collective address to state law differs from ETCA.
ETCA Title III includes pertinent state laws within its definition of
antitrust laws. NCRPA does not do so. Rather, NCRPA's "rule of
reason standard" subjects "any State law similar to the antitrust laws"
defined in NCRPA to its "rule of reason standard"249 and, to the extent
a defined venture has availed itself of notification procedures, NCRPA
limits recoveries under "any State law providing damages for conduct
similar to that forbidden by the antitrust laws" to actual damages. 2"
As noted, NCRPA's definition of "antitrust laws" calculatedly
avoids the embrace of FTCA's address to "unfair or deceptive acts or
practices." State unfair trade practice statutes (to the extent they avoid
adoption of the "unfair methods of competition" legend) are not
necessarily similar to the "antitrust laws" defined in NCRA.
Consequently, standards guiding the application of such state statutes are
not necessarily preempted by NCRA's rule of reason and, to the degree
states afford (or permit) greater than actual damages to those injured by
conduct violating state unfair trade practices acts, the limitation explicit
in NCRPA may be inapplicable. Whether these consequences were
intended by legislative and other sponsors of NCRA is not disclosed by
the legislative history. Such intention is unlikely. Failures to preempt
probably were unanticipated, relating more to a slovenly failure to
consider what was involved in ETCA's inclusion of only part of FTCA
§ 5(a)(1) when the ETCA definition of federal "antitrust laws" was
carelessly lifted for use in what became NCRPA.
NCRPA's failures to preempt may have significances beyond state
unfair trade practices statutes. Thus, surviving state "unfair sales acts"
tend to have more in common with the penal § 3 of the Robinson-Patman
Act (which criminalized certain price discriminations) than they do with
§ 2(a) of the Clayton Act. Section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act is not
one of the "antitrust laws" as that term is defined by NCRPA. Since
state unfair sales acts are of relatively little consequence in this day and
age, they are not developed herein save to note that it is quite arguable
that they are not to be held "similar to ... antitrust laws" addressed by
either NCRPA's rule of reason or its limitation of liability.
In any event, those who organize a venture defined at NCRPA
§ 2(a)(6) must consider potencies for applications to its operations of not
248. ETCA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4016(a), 4021(b).
249. NCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 4302.
250. Id. § 4303(c) (emphasis added).
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only FTC rule-making and prosecutions concerning "unfair ... acts or
practices" but also, at least, state unfair trade practices statutes.
IV. NCRPA Limitation of Damages
NCRPA's "detrebling" provisions"' require more of a joint R&D
venture than does the NCRA "rule of reason standard." Whereas
existence and activities of all joint ventures within NCRPA § 2(a)(6) -
subject to NCRA § 2(b) - are entitled to analysis under the NCRPA
"rule of reason standard," there is a price attendant upon the
achievement of a limitation of liability. Affirmative acts are exacted
from qualified venturers desiring prospective protection. Notifications
conforming to standards in NCRPA must be filed with the DOJ and the
FTC. 2
Limitation is not available to a defendant if the challenged conduct
is violative of a "decree or order, entered after October 11, 1984, in any
case or proceeding under" NCRA-defined federal antitrust laws or State
laws challenging such conduct as part of a joint venture."
Disqualification from detrebling can occur although the prior decree does
not read on conduct intrinsic to the joint venture conduct latterly
challenged.
The point of NCRPA seems to be to allow every venture at least
one bite. Disqualification from the detrebling NCRPA relatively safe
harbor keys on the existence of a "decree or order" vice a judgement.
In this one respect, NCRPA can be characterized as more rigorous than
ETCA Title III since a COR is not necessarily prejudiced by a loss in
any proceeding other than a formal revocation. On the other hand,
under NCRPA, only limitation of liability is prejudiced by a prior
decree; applicability of the NCRPA "rule of reason standard" is unabated
by a prior decree.
It should be noted that, as some sort of moral recompense to
plaintiffs who proceed to a damage award, NCRA mandated and NCPA
continues payment of interest from "the earliest date for which injury can
be established . . . [until] . . . date of judgement, unless and to the
extent the court finds an award of interest unjust."" 4
251. Id. § 4304.
252. Id. §§ 4303, 4305.
253. Id. § 4303(e) (emphasis added).
254. Id. § 4303(d).
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A. Invasion of State Sovereignty
Turning from the one-almost-free-bite rule, the three limitation
provisions seem, at a glance, to be straightforward. However, there is
a disproportion between federal and state limitations as impingement on
state remedies proceeds well beyond detrebling. Two of the three
provisions focus on claims asserted by persons25" and states 256 under
§§ 4 and 4c of the Clayton Act. 7  The third looks to the person
proceeding under state laws, "providing damages for conduct similar to
that forbidden by the [NCRPA-defined] antitrust laws." 2"  While
NCRPA is true "detrebling" as it relates to §§. 4 and 4c of the Clayton
Act, the address to state power goes much further. It provides that a
successful plaintiff under a pertinent state law "shall not recover in
excess of the actual damages sustained." 2" This preempts states not
only to the extent they afford treble damages but also to the degree their
courts might permit recovery of punitive damage awards as part of the
states' continuing evolution of discrete approaches to tort litigation.
The consequence is a substantial invasion of states' otherwise
sovereign powers not only to legislate unfair competition rules and
remedies but to permit courts of general and original jurisdiction -
courts very different from federal courts - to evolve forms of relief
appropriate to the torts before them.
B. The NCRPA Disclosure Regime: The Price of Damage Limitation
There is a cost for the limitation of liability under NCRA § 4. The
relatively sheltered harbor is prospective. Damages are limited for
injurious conduct indulged - after effectiveness of an initial
"notification" filed with the FTC and the DOJ (as well as appropriate
supplements thereto) on behalf of a defined venture' - but only to
the degree such conduct "is within the scope of" the notification.26
However, potential plaintiffs cannot be charmed by the paucity of
required data and consequent ability for the "scope" to.be broad indeed.
All that is evoked are (a) the identities of parties to the venture
including, if the NCRPA venture is for production as opposed to R & D,
the nationality of such parties and the folks who control parties plus (b)
a disclosure of the nature and objectives of the venture. 62 Any lawyer
255. NCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 4303(a).
256. Id. § 4303(b).
257. 15 U.S.C. § 15, 15c.
258. NCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 4303(c).
259. Id.
260. Id. § 4305(a).
261. Id. § 4303(a)(1), (b)(1), (c)(1).
262. Id. § 4305(a).
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who has conjured with the values implicit in sometimes drawing a
detailed corporate charter, and other times being content with a charter
having the vaguest purpose clause, will recognize the challenge. For
NCRPA purposes, cover the waterfront in generalities; include language
embracing that NCRPA permits without at all limiting commercial
spheres of endeavor!
C. Presumed Point of Disclosure
The presumed point of the NCRPA disclosure regime is to provide
not only early warnings of sorts to the DOJ and the FTC, but also,
through notices in the Federal Register that describe "in general terms
the area of planned activity of" comprehended ventures, 3 advices of
lesser quality to venturers' competitors and others (including, quite
conceivably, securities analysts). However, the damage control shields
address the scope of the notification filed with the DOJ and the FTC
rather than the scope of the Federal Register notice. The published
notice need not be coextensive with the filing.
When they opt to file a notification, venturers must make a
"judgement play" of sorts concerning the organization and content of the
"notification." Warning that NCRA protections are "based on the
contents of" notifications, the DOJ and the FTC avoided the role of SEC
reviewers of registration statements and accepted the role of notice
editors. 2  This was consistent with Congressional recognition that
notifications need not be all that informative:
A joint R&D venture need not specifically notify [the DOJ] and..
the FTC that it intends to engage in the activities described in Section
2(a)(6) of the bill, provided that the venture supplies [the DOJI and
... the FTC with the notification described in section 6(a). Thus,
unless a venture has notified [the DOJ] and . . . the FTC to the
contrary, any activity within the definitions of section 2(a)(6) is
within the scope of any venture as to which notification has been filed
under Section 6(a). For example, unless the venture has indicated
otherwise, efforts to market the results of the venture, such as
through licensing, will automatically be considered within the scope
of a properly notified joint R&D venture.
2
6
263. Id. § 4305(b).
264. See U.S. Dept. of Justice Statement of Dec. 11, 1984, reprinted in Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
4513 in context of NCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 4305(b).
265. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1044, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3137.
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D. Arrival in NCRPA § 4 Safe Harbors
Assuming the effectiveness of a "notification," the NCRPA
sheltered harbor is limited to conduct within the scope of the
notification. 2' However, a plaintiff has no right to examine the
notification before commencing litigation.267 Even when litigation
commences, discovery of federal resources is limited.268 NCRPA
provides against the DOJ or FTC release of any part of a filed
notification except "the information published" in the Federal
Register. 9 So, while venturers are deciding whether or not to file a
notification, they may not have to be all that concerned with the
adequacy of disclosure via the Federal Register to the public. The same
covertness is true of data developed by the DOJ or FTC "in the course
of any investigation, administrative proceeding, or case, with respect to
a potential violation of the antitrust laws by" the venture concerning
which notification was filed.27 "Catch 22" seems too modest an
accolade for this ingenious deterrence to a potential private plaintiff's
sensible cost-benefit analysis before daring to commence litigation
burdened by the NCRPA "rule of reason standard."
At the outset of this Article, extended reference was made to the
requirement that "detrebling" is contingent on "principal" production
facilities being in the United States and the amenability of a foreign
investor's home nation to giving a U.S. company "antitrust treatment no
less favorable ... than" the treatment given its own citizens' in re joint
production ventures.27
The author is not all that persuaded that damage control is
necessarily worth the Federal Register notice and DOJ/FTC early
warning requirements. However, those who wish the relatively safe
harbor are not encouraged to indulge crypticisms. Rather, mindful of the
potency of review by trial judges, notifications and modifications alike
should be drawn in such manner as to inform a semi-sophisticated reader
of not only liberally-stated commercial parameters of the undertaking
(paying great care to qualifications concerning otherwise excluded
conduct)272 but also aspects of the contemplated operation that might
be offensive to normal antitrust norms (e.g., interlocking boards of an
266. See NCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 4303(a)(1), (b)(1), (c)(1).




271. NCPA § 3(g).
272. NCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 4301(b).
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incorporated joint venture vehicle and incorporated venturers). The
phrase "semi-sophisticated" serves a conviction that the 1984 and 1993
Congresses did not seek to replicate a standard akin to the "average
investor" supposedly addressed in prospectuses qualified under the
federal Securities Act of 1933.273 Notifications under NCRA are not
aimed at the public or any segment of it. Official addressees, the DOJ
and FTC, must be presumed to possess legal and economic
sophistications beyond the average investor. Trial judges, later to be
called upon to measure the "scope" of notifications, must be presumed
to possess the legal sophistication of the average lawyer.
NCRPA affords the DOJ and FTC power only to determine the
"general terms" of the Federal Register notice. 4 The adequacy of the
notice is not germane to the effectiveness of the notification and
achievement of NCRPA damage control. Whether the agencies will
strain to develop an "average competitor" standard for the notices is
doubtful. Publications through 1992 did not remove the doubt. On a
theoretical basis, the DOJ and FTC are helpless to resist the effectiveness
of a notification that informs them that an NCRPA § 2(a)(6) venture will
embark on missions or use techniques the authorities would prefer not to
countenance. "Theoretical" is stressed since, unlike an ETCA Title III
COR,275 NCRPA does not constrain DOJ and FTC uses of
investigative powers. Like ETCA, NCRPA fails to constrain FTC
powers either to investigate or promulgate rules as to "unfair . . .acts
or practices" or to prosecute such acts or practices. Thus, while there
is a temptation to regard the DOJ and FTC as paper tigers when
confronted with a plainly anticompetitive NCRPA notification, the
temptation should be resisted. If one considers only their investigative
powers, the agencies continue to have weapons to harass and, thereby,
greatly magnify venturers' overhead. Looking beyond agency
investigatory powers, the DOJ and FTC can prosecute. Even were this
not so, prudent planners will not provide incentives for judges trying a
damage action to discover species of conduct beyond the scope of the
venture disclosed to the DOJ and FTC.
V. NCRPA & Attorney's Fees
Like ETCA,276 NCRPA threatens losing private plaintiffs with
liability for defendants' attorney's fees. This threat, however, is not as
273. In re Universal Camera Corp., 19 S.E.C. 648 (1945).
274. NCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 4305(b).
275. ETCA, 15 U.S.C. § 4013(a)(3).
276. ETCA, 15 U.S.C. § 4016(b)(4).
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significant as in ETCA. NCRPA directs the court to favor "a
substantially prevailing" defendant with an award of "the cost of suit
I including a reasonable attorney's fee, if the claim or. .. claimant's
conduct during .. . litigation... was frivolous, unreasonable, without
foundation, or in bad faith. "2' Awards are subject to being offset to
the extent a court finds that the prevailing party burdened the litigation
frivolously, unreasonably, without foundation, or in bad faith.278 The
process of awarding costs to successful defendants is not linked to the
existence or adequacy of a notification under NCRA § 6.
ETCA anticipated NCRA and NCPA in its concern for defendants
but explicitly limited plaintiffs' exposure to situations in which there is
a finding that defendants did not violate standards enunciated in
ETCA. 279 That NCRPA is not so limited is obvious. Yet, if one
ignores the "Catch 22" implicit in compelling a suit to discover the
context of a notification,' NCRPA does not indicate a dedication to
punishing zealous "private attorneys-general."
VI. Organizing & Maintaining NCRPA Ventures
Prior to recommending approaches to organizing and thereafter
maintaining a venture qualified for the maximum use of NCRA safe
harbors, certain elemental questions must be addressed. On the face of
the matter, commonly controlled persons are not excluded from forming
NCRPA joint ventures. That such an eventuality was not contemplated
by Congress seems a given but this does not preclude NCRPA joint
ventures by commonly controlled focus with or without "outsiders."
Assuming a conforming venture,"' what of its activities neither
included nor excluded by NCRPA? What of agreements between or
among venturers that are excluded by NCRA § 2(b)?2
It is easy enough to say that such conduct is not entitled to judicial
application of the NCRPA "rule of reason standard." The rule of reason
standard keys on conduct indulged "in or performing a contract to carry
out" an NCRA-defined venture and such a venture is recognized by
reference to activities permitted it. But such a response would ignore
very real questions and thereby be too simplistic.
277. NCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 4304(a)(2).
278. Id. § 4304(b).
279. ETCA, 15 U.S.C. § 4016(b)(4).
280. See supra text accompanying notes 262-65.
281. NCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(6).
282. Id. § 4301(b).
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Does an otherwise conforming venture lose its character as one
defined by NCRA § 2(a)(6) when it engages in activities beyond the
scope of NCRA § 2(a)(6)? Will the answer vary by reference to whether
the additional activity is anti-competitive? What is anti-competitive for
such a company? Whether or not indulgence in additional activities
disqualifies pro tanto combines from being NCRPA joint venturers,
thereby debarring them from the NCRPA "rule of reason standard" and
damage control, what is the effect of venturers' side agreements that are
quite apart from their NCRPA venture but run afoul of the exclusions
spelled out by NCRPA definition? What if two of ten NCRPA venturers
have a side agreement (unknown to the other eight) that would be
excluded by NCRPA § 2(b)? Is the joint venture so tainted as to deny
all other ventures and the venture itself the benefits of NCRPA?
Once again, the starting point is the statute. NCRA equates a
contemplated "venture" with "activities" undertaken for enumerated
purposes.213 There is no limitation against engagement in activities
additional to those coincident with explicitly approved purposes save as
excluded by NCRPA § 2(b).' If Congress intended to limit
permissible activities of a defined venture to those particularized in
NCRA, it would have been easy enough so to write. What Congress
did, through its repeated use of "joint venture" as a defined term of art
in NCRPA, was clearly to bless activities serving identified purposes as
eligible prima facie for the safe harbors. Activities serving purposes
within the particularizations of sub-parts (A) through and including (G)
of NCRPA § 2(a)(6) and the qualifications to the subparts of NCRPA
§ 2(b) are clearly eligible for the safe harbors. All such conduct is to be
judged within the NCRPA rule-of-reason. However, the NCRPA "rule
of reason standard" is broader as it reads on "conduct of" persons
"performing a contract to carry out a joint venture." Any other
construction would be insensible since, in effect, it would hamper the
organization and operation of an incorporated or unincorporated joint
venture vehicle as a cost and profit center (or as a series of such centers
geared to discrete R&D goals) in order to effect its own enterprise
planning, production planning and control procurements, marketing,
hiring, firing, and other entrepreneurial activities in a businesslike
fashion to serve national purposes.
So, responding to the not too rhetorical questions posed some
paragraphs ago, activities of not only a defined venture but also the
283. Id. § 4301(a)(6).
284. Id. § 4301(b).
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venturers therein are subject to usual antitrust norms only to the degree
that such activities are clearly excluded by the qualifications of NCRPA
§ 2(c) from activities permitted by the Act. Indulgences in such "ultra
vires" activities, even should they be subject to characterization as
anticompetitive or otherwise violative of antitrust laws or FTCA
§ 5(a)(1), do not deny NCRA safe harbors for other activities either
clearly serving purposes approved by NCRPA § 2(a)(6), falling within
the qualifications to its excluded activities, or being entirely unaddressed
in explicit terms.
Planners will do well to define commercial objectives and proceed
from there through discrete analyses of (a) what can be done without
prejudice to obtain the benefit of the NCRA rule of reason and (b) what
must be done to achieve safe harbors triggered by filing. Clients must
be told that filing a "notification" is not a price of access to the NCRPA
"rule of reason standard."
Assuming neutrality of all other factors such as securities regulation
and tax regulations, a-venture vehicle possessed of the capacity of self-
management always will be best to accommodate day-to-day management
including licensing. The same conclusions follow if there is sensitivity
to one or another venturer deriving an unfair advantage and to the extent
there is a need perceived to avoid occasions of rawer manifestations of
conduct. A distinct vehicle, preferably but not necessarily organized as
a corporation, would be able to contract with suppliers and customers as
well as to guard itself and its property from unauthorized exploitations
by venturers. It is quite conceivable that the master agreement between
or among venturers would invoke the data exchange qualification to
NCRPA in order to guard against individual venturers' ability to abuse
the overall licit relationship. The real world provides a sufficient history
of suppliers, customers, and licensors' negotiating to achieve access to
reciprocals' books for the proper purpose of keeping other organizations
honest. Why should data exchanges, designed to keep joint venturers
honest with one another and society at large, be any different?
Earlier, it was recommended that the vehicle be made a party to the
base contract. This recommendation stands whether or not a filing
appropriate to the safe harbors is to be made. It is also commended that
counsel to NCRPA venturers and, ultimately, ventures examine state
unfair practice laws and the FTCA § 5(a)(1) "unfair . . . acts or
practices" jurisdiction in the context of the venturer's purposes and
implementation thereof. Such sensitivity should extend through licensing
and marketing. Failure, induced by what may be only a passing
enfeeblement of the FTC, to consider the power implicit in the
Commission's jurisdiction over "unfair" acts will serve clients poorly
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indeed if the Commission is reinvigorated and staffed with folk disdainful
of NCRPA.
VII. Conclusion
The starting point is the statute. In the case of NCRPA, legislative
history of NCRA and NCPA is more concealing than revealing. What
has been blessed is international, not merely national, cooperation.
American entrepreneurs definitely are not benefitted to a degree beyond
non-Americans. The number of filings with the DOJ and FTC will not
tell us anything more than a minimum number of firms claiming the fidl
benefit of NCRPA. The NCRPA "rule of reason standard" well may
come to be invoked by non-filers. What benefits will flow from NCRPA
will depend entirely on the sagacity of affiliates in multinational as well
as domestic joint ventures. We have been sent, all too carelessly, to
voyage on uncharted seas somehow or other reminiscent of those once
dominated by robber barons as later refined by Japan, Inc.
